The pictures emerging from Afghanistan show a tragedy playing out live and proof of an American foreign policy disaster.
Bodies hang from the gates to towns captured by the Taliban. In Lashkar Gah, the first provincial capital the Taliban captured, Taliban fighters posed proudly, a dead child on the street behind them. Halfway across the country, a young child lies in the hospital recovering from a Taliban beating. His crime? The Taliban disliked his father.
The events unfolding recall Cambodian Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak’s famous letter to the American ambassador almost 46 years ago as the Americans withdrew while the Khmer Rouge swept through the country: “I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection and we can do nothing about it. You leave us and it is my wish that you and your country will find happiness under the sky. … I have only committed the mistake of believing in you, the Americans.”
History repeats. The U.S. drive to make peace with the Taliban was always misguided, though it did have Washington cheerleaders. Whereas 20 years ago a bipartisan array of officials criticized Secretary of State Colin Powell when he proposed working with “moderate Taliban,” attitudes changed. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “You don’t make peace with your friends. You have to be willing to engage with your enemies.”
President Donald Trump agreed.
Three years ago, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced Zalmay Khalilzad would join the State Department “to assist us in the reconciliation effort.” Within Foggy Bottom, Khalilzad might have appeared a perfect choice. He was born in Afghanistan and, like many Taliban, was Pashtun. He understood the nuances of Afghan culture like few others and spoke both Pashto and Persian fluently. What Pompeo saw as an advantage, however, was in reality a liability. Afghans have never trusted Khalilzad. Where Washington saw neutrality, Afghans saw an ethnic partisan. Whereas American officials treat with umbrage the suggestion that Khalilzad acted more Afghan than American, Afghans question how they should view Khalilzad given his earlier flirtation with seeking Afghanistan’s presidency. Most Americans have also forgotten Khalilzad’s advocacy for and business dealings with the Taliban pre-9/11; few Afghans, however, have forgiven this lapse in judgment.
But the real problem is not just Khalilzad’s past but also his present.
To justify continued peace talks, Khalilzad insisted that the Taliban had changed. He said that they were not the same group who deceived the Clinton administration in pre-9/11 diplomacy. Whereas once the Taliban partnered with al Qaeda, now they embraced Afghan nationalism. Many Afghans believed otherwise, but they had no way to say so: Khalilzad brokered no dissent. He and the embassy colluded to deny visas to senior Afghan officials who might talk to Congress. Only now does Khalilzad acknowledge what so many knew: The Taliban want the “lion’s share of power.” As for the current violence, Afghans note with regret the human cost of Khalilzad’s work. Ashraf Haidari, Afghanistan’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, noted that Khalilzad’s agreement, taken without the Afghan government’s consent, to release 5,500 hardcore Taliban fighters now drives the current violence.
Meanwhile, Khalilzad lives it up on the taxpayer dime.
He appears to be the most traveled U.S. official under not only the Trump administration but also the Biden administration. In the last year, he has visited not only Afghanistan but also Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, some multiple times. He has also used his portfolio to visit China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom and to hit the conference circuit. Certainly, some of these trips were necessary, but many were the equivalent of John Kerry’s visit to Antarctica: superfluous. Khalilzad went, dined on the government dime, and rented out five-star hotel suites because he could and because he enjoys the spotlight.
Perhaps Washington could overlook such extravagance if Afghan women and children were not dying in the streets for pursuing a process Khalilzad engineered. The tragedy was avoidable had Biden relieved Khalilzad and appointed his own envoy to pursue a more realistic, rational, less self-serving policy.
Regardless, it is time to recall Khalilzad home. His judgment proved wrong, and he has lost control of the process. Rather than interfere where Afghans no longer want him, it is time to investigate the intelligence failures, poor assumptions, and misjudgments that tainted the peace process from day one. Khalilzad should spend his days at Senate hearings answering questions about what went wrong and why.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
