Whether through arrogance or ignorance, the Obama administration falsely assessed the ability of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to curtail Iran’s illicit nuclear activities. Even from day one, the deal they presented fell far short of the red lines to which President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry swore they would uphold. Far from creating the most robust inspections and monitoring regime, Obama and Kerry watered down on precedent to create a far weaker standard for all future non-proliferation deals, notwithstanding the politicized and corrupt analysis from groups such as the Arms Control Association. Kerry also caved to Iran on its ballistic missile work, reversing language that had unequivocally banned Iran’s work on potential delivery systems and instead giving Iran wiggle room to pursue multi-stage rockets capable of delivering a nuclear warhead anywhere in the Middle East and, with time, even into Europe or North America.
Senator Tom Cotton, R-Ark., has put together a fact sheet highlighting some of the problems the JCPOA did not address and identified three major flaws:
Sunsets: At year eight of the deal, restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program begin to “sunset,” allowing Iran to steadily industrialize its uranium enrichment program. By year 15, all restrictions expire, bringing Iran to the brink of nuclear breakout.
Verification: The JCPOA fails to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) necessary authority to verify Iran’s compliance with the agreement.
Research and Development: The JCPOA allows Iran to develop advanced centrifuges which dramatically reduces the time needed to produce a nuclear weapon.
He is right on all three counts, of course, but there is a broader problem that has afflicted the agreement: From the very start of negotiations, Kerry and his aides assumed that Iran conducted all of its work inside Iran. It’s compartmentalization of the mind and shows how mirror imaging undercuts diplomacy. The United States would not conduct sensitive nuclear weapons in laboratories controlled by other states, and so negotiators ignored the possibility that Iran would do so. But, at the same time, intelligence and anecdotal reports suggest that North Koreans have been present at Iranian missile tests and Iranian engineers, scientists, and military officers have been present at North Korean tests.
It’s not a logical leap to consider that each nation’s scientists might escape scrutiny by working in each other’s laboratories. It’s no secret that North Korea will do almost anything for cash, so why assume that Pyongyang won’t allow Iran to offshore some nuclear work? Even if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) upheld its mandate to inspect the military bases on which Iran has conducted past nuclear weapons work, the JCPOA gave it no legal authority to consider that Iranian scientists might conduct mathematical modeling, war head design, or even basic explosives work inside North Korea. While it’s hard to hide a uranium centrifuge cascade (although Iran has also done that before), it’s much easier to hide the smaller laboratories involved in weapons design.
Nor is North Korea the only potential problem. No Iranian scientist can enter North Korea undetected by China, the air gateway to the communist hermit kingdom. Increasingly, Iranian scientists appear to be working in Hong Kong if not elsewhere in China on technologies that directly augment Iran’s military programs. The Tehran-based Sharif University of Technology, for example, has a joint Ph.D. program with Hong Kong’s University of Science and Technology (HKUST). Many of the Iranian students enrolled at HKUST work on sensitive projects such as the application of carbon fibers and graphene for radar-shielding. Some also work on aerospace technologies. Once these Iranian students finish their studies, they return to Iran to do their military service, usually in defense organization in fields relating to their Hong Kong, or China-based studies, hence the Iranian government’s sensitivity to any inspection of military bases.
European diplomats are currently lobbying Congress to argue that the Iran nuclear deal is working. The reality, however, is far different. The JCPOA has too many loopholes to adequately constrain Iran’s nuclear ambition.
Rather, it is a study in fiction. Obama and Kerry wanted an agreement –any agreement no matter how meaningless — while European states wanted cover to do business inside Iran. If the goal is to prevent Iran’s nuclear breakout, it is essential to acknowledge that the weaknesses of the deal go beyond even that which congressional Republicans have identified.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.
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