One of the major sticking points in Boris Johnson’s ongoing Brexit negotiations with the European Union is the so-called hard border issue — the European Union’s insistence on a hard border between British Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland unless an agreement is reached obviating the need for it.
A hard border is a non-starter in Parliament due to the risk it poses to Northern Ireland’s relative peace and prosperity. Republican dissidents on both sides of the border also view the prospect of a hard border with fury and a potential reason to resume political violence.
A hard border would physically symbolize the continuing supremacy of the British state over Northern Ireland. It would become a rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and direct action, at a time when the Real IRA terrorist group is already rising in activity and support.
The broader problem here is that a hard border would undercut the common Northern Irish political narrative since the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement. Namely, that Northern Ireland has thrived in the post-agreement devolution of power.
The police service has been reformed in order to escape its previous incarnation’s sectarian reputation, the British Army are off the streets, and the Northern Ireland assembly, when functioning, allows for peaceful interchange between previously warring political factions. Even when it isn’t functioning, the prosperity that has flowed with peace has enabled politicians across the political spectrum to present peace as beneficial to their constituents. The new status quo has held.
A hard border would undercut that narrative of a valued peace. And with the Northern Ireland assembly presently wracked by chaos and dysfunction, disruption of peace couldn’t come at a worse time.
Let us hope, then, that Johnson can reach a withdrawal agreement.
