The outbreak of violent protests in Kazakhstan is unlikely to alter Russia’s timetable or calculus for its prospective military action against Ukraine.
This is even though Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization have deployed a limited number of troops to support Kazakh security forces.
The protests broke out last weekend amid discontent over fuel subsidy cuts. Dozens of protesters and a smaller number of police officers have been killed, and sporadic violence continues. The public’s discontent appears to take deeper root in poor living standards and the kleptocratic rule of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Tokayev replaced longtime authoritarian President Nursultan Nazarbayev in 2019, but he continues to act as a front man for his predecessor.
On paper, the protests represent a twofold challenge to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In strategic terms, they risk the emergence of a more pro-Western government on Russia’s southern flank. A vast country, were it superimposed on Europe, Kazakhstan’s borders would reach from the southern tip of Spain to Poland’s border with Belarus. Though the absence of a unified protest movement reduces this risk, it cannot be entirely discounted. Putin views the security of his flanks as a preeminent concern.
In more personal terms, the destabilization of the existing order is something that Putin does not want to see anywhere near Russia’s borders. Such destabilization represents a threat to that which Putin’s inner circle prizes most: the assurance of its well-understood, enduring dominion over state power.
This linked concern of threatened new Western influence and a destabilized political order is what Putin feared in Belarus following the 2020 uprising against President Alexander Lukashenko’s election theft. As there, the Russian leader thus has good reason to stamp out these protests quickly and, if necessary, brutally. His forces will assist the Kazakh authorities in pursuing that objective. Putin will also, as he has in Belarus, hope to translate his support into longer-term political fealty from Kazakhstan. Again, Lukashenko’s now embarrassing supplication to Putin offers a road map.
At the same time, however, Russia retains both the strategic interest and capability to launch a new offensive against Ukraine. Reflecting the West’s continued concern, NATO air surveillance flights were, on Thursday, again gathering intelligence on the communications of Russian forces deployed in Crimea.
The Russian military deployment to Kazakhstan is highly limited. In contrast, Russian mechanized infantry, airborne infantry, special forces, air-to-ground, missile, electronic warfare, air-to-air, surface-to-air, and armored units now saturate Ukraine’s border areas. These capabilities are not easy or cheap to move, and their persistent forward deployment poses real challenges to morale (Russian commanders and noncommissioned officers are not very nice to their subordinates). Putin has also invested a great deal of political capital in the brinkmanship these deployments represent. In the context of the Kremlin’s existential rhetoric on Ukraine and Moscow’s unserious demands of Washington, these military deployments mean that a near-term invasion of Ukraine remains highly likely. Unless we start seeing these forces relocated to Kazakhstan, an invasion will remain likely.
Put another way, Kazakhstan is a complication for Putin — but not one that alters his Ukraine agenda.
