In recent weeks, several Republican presidential candidates have hinted at vague strategies for dealing with the threat posed by the Islamic State. They all have in common the “if only” factor: “If only President Obama had kept a residual military force in Iraq after 2011, then the Islamic State would not be a problem today.” This argument ignores the inconvenient fact that it was the Bush administration and the Iraqi government together that decided to withdraw all U.S. combat forces from Iraq by 2011. Critically, U.S. military forces were no longer welcome in Iraq.
It is worth remembering that the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement signed by the Bush administration was titled an “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.”
Article 24 required all U.S. forces to be out of the country by December 31, 2011, and Article 30 said that the agreement could only be amended by mutual consent. Although press reports at the end of 2011 focused on the disagreement about jurisdiction over U.S. forces, the real issue was the complete lack of political will in Baghdad to take the political heat to reverse course and ask the U.S. military to remain. Consent was gone.
This is a critical point. The U.S. does not and, especially after sovereignty was restored to Iraq, did not have the authority or the right to unilaterally station armed forces in Iraq without Baghdad’s permission. To suggest otherwise ignores international law and America’s own long-standing practices.
We do not allow our closest allies to exercise and train in this country without our express permission. Absent the agreement of the Iraqi government, after 2011, U.S. forces would have reverted to the status of an invading power and very likely would have found most of their energies engaged in self-defense.
Attacks against U.S. forces declined dramatically after 2008 in large part because Iraqi militant groups and militia knew we were leaving. We see echoes of this in the unwillingness of certain Iraqi militia to work with us against the Islamic State.
This is not a question of assigning blame. But a strategy for dealing with the Islamic State or any other security threat has to be built on fact, not wishful thinking or misinterpretation of history. At the end of the day, the war against the Islamic State will be won by the people on the ground who have far more at stake in this than we do. Simply stating that we will be stronger and more bellicose is not a strategy.
At a minimum, operating in Iraq will require that our troops not again become targets. Those who argue for sending more American servicemen and women back to Iraq bear the burden of explicitly explaining how things will be different this time and how they are going to persuade Iraqis of all stripes to welcome large-scale deployments once more.
Robert Loftis is a professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. Thinking of submitting an op-ed to the Washington Examiner? Be sure to read our guidelines on submissions.
