While not without attenuating risks, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army presence at Bagram Airfield would offer advantages to Beijing.
Paul Shinkman reported on Tuesday that the PLA is conducting a feasibility study on establishing a presence at the airfield. The base would include civilian officials involved in China’s Belt and Road trade initiative. The Chinese foreign ministry might say this “is purely fake news,” but a Bagram base would yield three benefits for Beijing.
First, such a base would allow China to leverage its military power. As of right now, China and the Taliban have established a suspicious but stable relationship. In return for Chinese investments, the Taliban have pledged to constrict Islamic terrorists who would wish to use Afghanistan as a launchpad for attacks in China’s bordering Xinjiang province. The Turkistan Islamic Party stands out here.
But it’s not that simple. China is aware (or will soon learn) that the Taliban’s commitment to their word is qualified. With its U.S.-built infrastructure, Bagram would allow the PLA to threaten or conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations without the Taliban’s approval. A PLA presence might therefore pressure the Taliban into taking more proactive action against their enemies.
Secondly, Bagram would allow China to more effectively supervise its investments in Afghanistan. There would be simple but significant utility in operating an air base that allows China to move personnel and equipment at will. This would make Chinese investments more efficient and, in terms of engaging with the Taliban, more politically useful.
Third, a base in Bagram would allow the PLA to boost its international credentials. Military prestige is one consideration. But Bagram would also offer China a narrative victory over its preeminent global adversary, the United States. China’s argument would be something along the lines of: “America abandoned Afghanistan in ignominy, we offer stability.” China would also almost certainly operate some form of foreign aid effort out of Bagram, citing it as proof of Beijing’s moral beneficence. Beijing would hope this might earn favor from the European Union, which is increasingly concerned by China’s foreign policy conduct.
That said, a Chinese presence at Bagram wouldn’t be without risks. The base would be a target for terrorist attacks. It would be expensive and complicated to operate. And should Chinese-Taliban relations sour, Beijing might be forced into its own embarrassing retreat. As much as it might benefit, China would also face international pressure to use Bagram to leverage human rights concessions from the Taliban. The militarization of China’s activities in Afghanistan would also risk parallels being drawn to its policy against the Uyghur people of Xinjiang.
Xi Jinping must decide whether these risks exceed Bagram’s prospective benefits.
