Now that a nuclear deal with Iran has been announced, one thing is clear: the agreement’s terms seem poised to cripple its viability.
The United States and its P5+1 partners caved on enrichment, possible military dimensions and sanctions relief. And provisional readings of the agreement indicate that ballistic missile sanctions and the arms export embargo will be terminated. What’s more, the so-called “snapback” sanctions enforcement mechanism will be hampered by two things. First, there is a multi-step dispute resolution process that treats Iran as an equal voting member of the commission charged with looking into violations.
Second, as the deal says, “Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments” under the agreement. This sounds like Iran will walk if sanctions are re-imposed.
There is an alternative to this flawed deal: A deal that dismantles Iran’s illicit nuclear program—as the Obama administration repeatedly pledged to do. There are six steps Washington can take to get that better deal.
First, Congress should review the deal with an eye toward revising problematic components. Renegotiation of agreements has precedent in arms control negotiations. Certain terms are unsound. Moreover, the deal is conceptually flawed because it permits Iran’s nuclear program to expand exponentially after 10-15 years.
Second, the doomsday scenarios should be deemphasized. We need to remind ourselves that the choice is not between this Iran deal and war. Historically, Iran has increased its nuclear activities cautiously so as not to invite a military response or crippling sanctions. We still have time before we have to call in the Air Force.
The Obama administration has argued that if America doesn’t accept this agreement, we would be isolated and our sanctions architecture would crumble. It will certainly take strong leadership and hard work from our diplomats, but the coalition can be kept together if the parties want to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
The president has said that we and our partners can re-impose sanctions if Iran violates the deal. By that logic, if we can hold the coalition together once companies re-enter Iran when economic leverage is weaker, then we should be able to hold it together before sanctions are lifted.
Third, Congress and the administration must fully coordinate on policy decisions moving forward. Capitol Hill is apt to understand the flaws in this deal—that the United States failed to use all the leverage it had to convince Iran to dismantle its nuclear program and settled. Congress may want to increase economic pressure on Iran to ensure a better deal. The administration will move more slowly to increase pressure than perhaps Congress would like. The Obama administration will, therefore, need to communicate with and listen to Congress better than it has over the past year and a half. Members of Congress have not been shy about expressing disappointment at the lack of communication.
Fourth, we will need to bring our allies with us. During the negotiations with Iran, the U.S. reportedly pushed our allies to accept some terms they thought were unwise. We should have listened to them then, but now we’ll need to provide them cover to walk away from flawed components of this deal as well. If the P5+1 can renegotiate this deal but keep the sanctions architecture in place—and the Joint Plan of Action’s (JPOA) restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities as well, minimal and flawed though they are—our team may be able to get a better deal.
Fifth, the U.S. should work with our allies to re-escalate. While voluntarily abiding by the JPOA’s limitation on the imposition of new nuclear sanctions, Washington should increase sanctions against all Iranian companies and individuals engaged in terror finance, human rights abuses or systemic corruption. Exclusively nuclear sanctions don’t exist in U.S. law, but neither is there a firewall between Iranian entities that support terrorism and those that control Iran’s nuclear program. Rolling these sanctions out every 30 days or so would provide off-ramps to give Iran the opportunity to come back to the table with a greater willingness to compromise.
Finally, if Tehran has not taken any of the exits along the highway, the U.S. should dramatically escalate sanctions, potentially sending Iran back into a deep recession and threatening the regime with economic collapse.
By returning to an escalatory sanctions environment, the U.S. can give Iran a choice between its nuclear program and economic survival. Many supporters of this deal used to claim that Iran needed to be presented with exactly this choice. But, as Iran approached that economic precipice, Washington eased off and as a result ended up with a deeply flawed deal.
We can regain the upper hand and get a better deal—maybe not tomorrow, and maybe not under this president. But if we show Tehran that it needs an agreement more than we do and that we’re prepared to wait, we might just get the deal we were promised 18 months ago.
Annie Fixler is a policy analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance.Thinking of submitting an op-ed to the Washington Examiner? Be sure to read our guidelines on submissions.
