Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s much-anticipated counteroffensive began in the Kherson Oblast on Aug. 29.
Recapturing Kherson would secure Odesa — keeping access open to the Black Sea, isolating Russian forces on the Crimean Peninsula, and possibly sending a shock wave throughout Russia. It would be a significant turning point and a huge shift in momentum.
The counteroffensive actually began a couple of weeks ago, when Ukraine struck military bases and supply depots in Crimea, creating panic among sunbathing Russian tourists. These tourists then jammed the highways exiting the peninsula, cutting off logistics and fire support to Russian front-line soldiers in the fight. These types of pre-offensive strikes are referred to as “condition setting.” It’s about keeping the enemy hungry and tired, fostering a feeling of hopelessness.
Encouragingly, there are reports of Ukrainian forces liberating several settlements west and northwest of Kherson, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.
Initial success is positive, but Ukraine must sustain its counteroffensive. It must maintain relentless pressure and pursuit of the enemy before Russia can reinforce its front lines with its revamped Third Army Corps. Interdiction of supply lines will be essential as well. The “fog of war” is alive and well in the Kherson Oblast, as both Kyiv and Moscow push their narratives of what is taking place there. One thing is for sure, however, Ukraine doesn’t have to eat the whole elephant at once. It can do so one bite at a time. Ukraine is now dictating the terms of the battle — Russia is busy reacting.
What about that Russian Third Army Corps?
It stood up in June 2022. It’s largely a pick-up game of recruits between the ages of 18 and 50 — the volunteer battalions, with minimal training. Enticed with salaries between $2,100 and $5,000, these soldiers are the solution to the Kremlin’s manpower shortage. Unfortunately for the soldiers, they are also cannon fodder. The new corps is reportedly moving by rail, armed with T-80BV and T-90M tanks, toward Russian-held areas along Ukraine’s southeastern border. While the corps’s combat readiness is unknown, that it is desperately needed on the front lines to backfill personal and equipment losses is clear. In early August, the Pentagon claimed that Russia had sustained between 70,000 and 80,000 casualties. As many as 1,954 tanks and 4,294 armored personnel carriers have also been destroyed.
This may be Russian President Vladimir Putin’s last best shot, similar to Germany’s failed Ardennes Forest counterattack during World War II. But throwing a “corps” made up of recently formed and trained volunteer battalions into the fight against a battle-hardened Ukrainian military confirms the Kremlin’s strategy of attrition.
Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), DIA, NSA, and NGA. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics. Follow him on Twitter @JESweet2022.
