Iran struggles against Western and Israeli intelligence efforts. That truth bears consideration in light of the claim on Tuesday by Iran’s civilian intelligence chief, Mahmoud Alavi, that his service has recently arrested dozens of spies working for foreign powers.
I doubt Alavi’s honesty. In fact, it’s far more likely that Alavi is buffering his own reputation amid unprecedented internal power jockeying in Tehran.
Of course, Iran’s intelligence service regularly likes to throw innocents in prison on trumped up espionage charges. It does so for propaganda effect, to appease hardliners who see spies everywhere, and as part of an inefficient intelligence turf war with the Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s feckless approach to intelligence reflects the sustained pressure it faces from Western and allied (primarily Israeli) high-priority intelligence efforts.
In part, that’s because Iran offers surprising connectivity with the world through its borders and airports and ports of entry. But it’s also because Tehran’s warren of back streets and the Western sympathies of many of its citizens makes working with outside intelligence services both possible and preferable. While the Iranian intelligence services conduct aggressive surveillance of Western officials, interests, and Iranians under suspicion, there are means of avoiding these efforts. Equally important, Western intelligence services have improved their tradecraft in Iran over the past few years in order to keep their operatives safer. But what does the spying look like?
Well, U.S. intelligence collection efforts against Iran are situated in a range of advanced signal intelligence programs (intercepting phone calls, internet traffic, etc.) and the targeted recruitment of Iranian officials when they travel abroad. But other Western allies excel at the toughest challenge: recruiting Iranian agents on Iranian soil. Israel is the unquestionable leader in this regard, but two other U.S.-allied powers also operate strong human intelligence networks in Iran. The result is a steady stream of intelligence on what the various Iranian factions are feeling, doing, and planning. And while this knowledge prevents terrorist attacks and uncovers otherwise hidden Iranian machinations, it also has a valuable side benefit: promoting already significant mutual mistrust between various Iranian officials and forcing them to chase phantoms as well as spies.
In short, bear Alavi’s crowing claims of success with a healthy degree of proportionate skepticism.
