On Sunday, the Palestinian terrorist group and political entity, Hamas, stated that it will accept new elections and a restored Palestinian unity government.
It might sound good, but it isn’t. Hamas is an astute political party, but it not a democratically concerned actor. It would never entertain a transfer of power unless it believed that doing so would strengthen its own position over its rivals. And in this case, Hamas’ main rival is the political bloc Fatah, which holds power in the West Bank.
The best evidence for this conclusion is the history of what occurred following the last elections in 2006. A year following that election, in which Hamas was victorious, Hamas fighters threw Fatah supporters off Gazan roofs and seized almost total control. This led to a schism between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza that has endured until today.
That said, why is Hamas now calling for elections?
Three reasons.
First, Hamas is running short on cash and investments, reducing its ability to provide much needed social services to the population of Gaza. Yet the budget pains also restrict Hamas from its ambition of creating a powerful, stable and well-organized government. As Hamas sees it, a strong government isn’t just important in controlling Gaza (and, it hopes, one day also the West Bank). It’s also crucial in giving Hamas a stronger foundation on which to advance its “resistance” against Israel. Put simply, the more stability it has in Gaza, the more ease with which Hamas will be able to plot, resource, and effect terrorism against Israel.
Second, Hamas recognizes the power dynamics in the Middle East have shifted against its interests. Having lost its primary supporter, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and witnessing the new Gulf-Arab alignment away from Qatar and towards a more skeptical position on counter-terrorism related issues, Hamas faced a growing downturn in its ability to attract external support. By calling elections alongside the pretense of a compromise with the more-moderate Fatah, Hamas hopes to create some positive breathing space with regional actors.
Third, and most important, Hamas feels it has nothing to lose. Opinion polls, though unreliable, suggest Hamas with a significant advantage over Fatah. Correspondingly, both in terms of political power and populist legitimacy, Hamas believes it will be the beneficiary of any election. Yet Hamas also has a secret weapon that it can deploy if necessary: its monopoly of force in Gaza. Ultimately, Hamas knows that should it decide doing so is necessary, it can destroy any Fatah representation in Gaza as it did in 2007. In this sense, there is no risk to rolling the dice, because the dice come with an insurance policy.
Ultimately, there’s a broader point here: We should always be cautious about claims of moderation from Islamic terrorist groups like Hamas. Seeing their purpose in life as serving an ordained mission from God, they would not yield power to democratic interests unless absolutely confident it would advance their interests above all others. This decision is a ploy.
