As with their respective energy policies, when it comes to nuclear weapons, Vladimir Putin would prefer Joe Biden’s policy to that of Donald Trump.
This is not to say that Putin wants Biden to defeat Trump in November. The opposite may well be true. That said, Moscow views the status and development of U.S. nuclear forces as a high priority concern. But where Trump has modernized U.S. nuclear capabilities and strategy, Biden opposes the U.S. reservation to employ nuclear weapons preemptively, rejects the deployment of low-yield warheads, and believes the U.S. nuclear forces budget can be cut.
As I say, nuclear weapons are a top concern of the Russian leader.
Reflected by his heavy investment in new hypersonic and undersea strike platforms, Putin views nuclear weapons in much the same way his Soviet predecessors did. Namely, as the irreplaceable means of constraining American hegemony and countering American global influence. Putin recognizes that his conventional armed forces would eventually lose any major conflict with the United States and NATO. But by dangling the credible threat of nuclear annihilation, Putin qualifies the utility of that conventional superiority. At the same time, Putin’s development of low-yield nuclear forces gives him the potential to operate in the “gray zone” between nuclear and conventional war. Russia’s nuclear weapons also serve as valuable nationalist propaganda tools at home and feature heavily in state media reporting.
So why would Putin prefer Biden to Trump, here?
Well, Trump’s nuclear policy has been defined by aggressive moves to counter Russian modernization programs. Relevant actions include Trump’s deployment of W76-2 low yield warheads and his investment in the Columbia-class submarine replacement for the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile fleet. Trump has also taken political action. We’ve seen America’s withdrawal, supported by its NATO allies, from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, in protest of Russian breaches of that agreement. Strategic Command, responsible for the operation of U.S. nuclear forces, has also advanced its communications, satellite, targeting, and survivability capacities under Trump.
Although not publicly announced, Strategic Command on Friday conducted a so-called “TACAMO” exercise with nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic Ocean. This exercise involves a Navy aircraft taking over nuclear strike communications in a situation where land-based headquarters have been destroyed or inoperable. These trainings and investments have three functions. First, to deny any adversary the prospect of nuclear victory by surprise attack. Second, to ensure that the president is able to order a successful nuclear strike at short notice. Third, to give the nation the best possible chance of winning a nuclear war (absurd as that might sound). While Britain and France operate their own nuclear deterrent programs, they are far smaller in scale than those of the U.S. military.
Biden’s statements suggest he would not continue on this course.
Nine days before the Obama administration left office, Biden argued that “given [America’s] non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of today’s threats, it’s hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary.” As with Biden’s rejection of low-yield weapons and support for nuclear budget cuts, his stance on first strikes is misguided. To rule out a first-use nuclear strike in any circumstances would limit military options in the face of some threats.
Consider, hypothetically, that in an existing state of crisis and conventional conflict, the U.S. detected North Korea moving nuclear warheads onto mobile launchers in various areas of their east coast. The president is told that there’s an 80% likelihood of destroying all the launchers with conventional airstrikes, but that rises to a 98% probability if nuclear weapons are used. That 20% versus 2% risk factor takes on exigent importance in consideration of Honolulu or Los Angeles being nuked. Yes, this is an unlikely and worst case scenario. But that cuts to the heart of why nuclear deterrence exists in the first place: to prevent nuclear exchanges.
Don’t misunderstand me. Nuclear policy demands a robust assessment of costs. While it’s true, for example, that missile defenses have utility against nations such as Iran and North Korea with fewer and less advanced nuclear strike platforms, they are not practical in the face of the massed nuclear forces possessed by China and Russia. At the same time, those defense systems fuel the Chinese and Russian pursuit of new weapons that can overcome existing defenses.
However, assessing where Trump and Biden stand on nuclear weapons, it seems clear that Putin would favor the latter. Biden should reconsider his approach.
