The problem at the core of the Democratic Party

It may seem a little premature for a conservative to point at a Democratic Party firmly in control of the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives as having problems, but according to liberal polling guru David Shor, the Democrats are on the edge of a long trip through the political wilderness.

At The New York Times, Ezra Klein writes of Shor’s polling projections:

In 2022, if Senate Democrats buck history and beat Republicans by four percentage points in the midterms, which would be a startling performance, they have about a 50-50 chance of holding the majority. If they win only 51 percent of the vote, they’ll likely lose a seat — and the Senate.

But it’s 2024 when Shor’s projected Senate Götterdämmerung really strikes. To see how bad the map is for Democrats, think back to 2018, when anti-Trump fury drove record turnout and handed the House gavel back to Nancy Pelosi. Senate Democrats saw the same huge surge of voters. Nationally, they won about 18 million more votes than Senate Republicans — and they still lost two seats. If 2024 is simply a normal year, in which Democrats win 51 percent of the two-party vote, Shor’s model projects a seven-seat loss, compared with where they are now.

Klein and Shor go on to blame structural factors that favor rural over urban voters in the Senate, but Shor also tells Klein this:

I don’t think it’s a coincidence that the people we’ve lost are likely to be low-socioeconomic-status people… If you look inside the Democratic Party, there are three times more moderate or conservative nonwhite people than very liberal white people, but very liberal white people are infinitely more represented. That’s morally bad, but it also means eventually they’ll leave.


The deeper problem with the Democrats is not a Senate that favors rural voters — it is that the hyper-educated radical white progressive elite that runs the party ultimately does not share the same values as the voters it purports to represent.

Nowhere is this more evident than the issue of immigration. Again from Klein:

Hillary Clinton “lost because she raised the salience of immigration, when lots of voters in the Midwest disagreed with us on immigration,” Shor said. This is where popularism poses its most bitter choices: He and those who agree with him argue that Democrats need to try to avoid talking about race and immigration. He often brandishes a table showing that among voters who supported universal health care but opposed amnesty for unauthorized immigrants, 60 percent voted for Obama in 2012 but 41 percent voted for Clinton in 2016. That difference, he noted, was more than enough to cost her the election.

The solution that Obama used to diffuse the immigration issue was just to never talk about it. Romney, Klein notes, helped Obama in this regard because he also was clearly uncomfortable talking about immigration.

Trump had no such qualms.

The question is if a post-Trump GOP will be as willing to engage on the issue.

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