It’s not every day that a senior North Korean official who has the ear of Kim Jong Un visits Washington to hand a personal letter to the U.S. president. But that is precisely what happened on Friday, June 1, when Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol (commonly referred to as Kim’s right-hand man) traveled to the White House to deliver a missive from his boss. President Trump, who has treated his June 12 summit preparations as if it were a season finale of the “Apprentice,” was no doubt embracing the event as an historical moment in American diplomacy. And, in a way, it is: the last time the Kim dynasty’s number-two man stepped foot in the White House was 18 years ago, when Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok had a meeting with President Bill Clinton for the purpose of arranging a possible presidential trip to Pyongyang (Clinton decided to prioritize Israeli-Palestinian peace over North Korean missile talks).
There is no denying that the last week of frenzied diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang has been impressive. Three separate American teams are engaged in three separate countries with their North Korean colleagues, precisely the type of preparation one would expect from two governments sincerely trying to get their leaders together. But despite all of the meetings, photo-ops, and handshakes that have occurred during this time, the Trump administration would be setting itself up for sadness and disappointment if it failed to keep the moment in perspective.
Warm and cheerful words in Pyongyang’s state media notwithstanding, North Korea is still North Korea — a country surrounded by far bigger and more prosperous neighbors, ruled by a leadership that is extremely paranoid about American intentions. It is because of this paranoia that the Kim regime was motivated to invest so much money and manpower (and sacrifice so much of its economy and social well-being) over a period of decades to attain a nuclear weapons capability.
To put it bluntly: Kim Jong Un, like his father and grandfather before him, is petrified of being invaded, deposed, and killed by the United States.
It is far, far too early to predict whether a groundbreaking denuclearization agreement with the North Koreans is possible. The stars have to perfectly align for a deal like this to happen. The Trump administration’s core position remains maximalist; the only way Pyongyang can enjoy some economic relief and rejoin the community of nations is if Kim makes the strategic decision to strip out its entire nuclear infrastructure. To Kim, however, such a demand is nothing less than a wholesale, radical shift in how the North Korean regime has operated over the previous three decades.
It is such a dramatic shift that economic incentives alone will not be enough to push the North Koreans to denuclearize. Trump cannot buy Kim Jong Un like former President George W. Bush bought Moammar Gadhafi.
A denuclearization agreement with North Korea will depend entirely on whether the United States can persuade the Kim regime that it will be safe, secure, and whole even without a nuclear weapons stockpile. The problem, though, is that this may be an unattainable task for the Trump administration, or any American administration, to accomplish.
There has been a lot of discussion about Gadhafi’s experience in 2003-2004, when the Libyan strongman decided to not only open up his country to American and British inspectors, but allow Washington and London to ship all of his chemical, biological, and nuclear components to Oak Ridge, Tenn., for destruction. For his troubles, Gadhafi was promised an end to the political isolation and sanctions architecture that decimated his economy. Gadhafi would be reintroduced to the world as a legitimate partner and a wise leader who made the right decision.
Upon news of the WMD agreement with the Libyans, Bush delivered a speech that Gadhafi’s cooperation would be rewarded. “As the Libyan government takes these essential steps and demonstrates its seriousness,” Bush promised “its good faith will be returned. Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States.”
We all know how the Gadhafi experience turned out. Less than eight years later, deprived of any personal dignity he had left, Gadhafi was dragged from a storm drain by armed rebels, filmed while he was being sodomized and executed. Bush’s promises of wealth and status turned out to be temporary and fleeting.
The North Koreans view Gadhafi’s humiliating downfall as a deliberate and clever ploy by the U.S. to disarm Tripoli of its most destructive weapons in order to keep the Libyans vulnerable. Kim has interpreted the Libya episode ever since as a warning — trust American assurances, and you will eventually pay for it with your life.
If there is to be a summit with Kim Jong Un on June 12, Trump’s steepest challenge will be in convincing Pyongyang that his security guarantees are more credible than the guarantees that Bush whispered into Gadhafi’s ear 15 years earlier. The Libyans were dumb enough to fall into the trap.
Unless Washington is prepared to offer something earth-shattering and politically untenable like a permanent withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea or the removal of South Korea and Japan from America’s nuclear umbrella, Kim Jong Un won’t repeat Gadhafi’s fatal mistake. And even then, the North Korean dictator may still cherish his nuclear weapons as a deterrent much too important to trade away.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
