After nearly 16 years, it’s become an unfortunate rite of passage for United States presidents: Address the nation to outline the way forward for the war in Afghanistan.
Each president has left his mark. President George W. Bush declared that the war’s aims were primarily to force the Taliban to “close terrorist training camps. Hand over leaders of the Al Qaeda network, and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens unjustly detained in our country.” The end goal, Bush added, was “to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them [Al Qaeda and the Taliban] out and bring them to justice.”
It was easier said than done. While the Taliban fell quickly and Al Qaeda elements fled across the border into Pakistan, Pakistan’s double game, a dysfunctional Afghan government, rampant corruption, NATO coordination undercut by coalition partner “caveats,” and strategic impatience in the U.S. as national security became a political football all created fertile ground for a Taliban insurgency.
When President Barack Obama took over, the war in Afghanistan was a quagmire. Speaking at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009, he outlined a new strategy. He announced a surge of troops into Afghanistan, but also their withdrawal. “These additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces,” he explained, “and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.”
This was a mistake. Consider that when Bush announced the surge in Iraq, he declared his end goal victory and left the U.S. commitment open-ended until the U.S. military achieved it. Obama did the opposite: Not understanding the psychological component to military operations, he signaled to the Taliban that they need only go to ground for 2.5 years and the country could be theirs. As U.S. forces pulled back, the Taliban filled the vacuum. Momentum matters. Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden was correct when, describing the mindset of the region, he declared, “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, they will naturally want to side with the strong horse.”
There are several questions that Trump needed to address, and most he did.
First and foremost, he needed to convince the American people that involvement in Afghanistan is crucial to our security and national interests. America has a short-term memory syndrome in which a decade is ancient history. It was crucial to remind Americans that allowing a safe-haven to exist in Afghanistan is what led to Sept. 11. While he did this, one speech is not enough: it needs to be a directed message every day and from every principle in his feuding administration.
Second, Trump needed to define victory. The Obama administration argued toward its end that Al Qaeda was on the run, and that the U.S. and even Afghans can live with the Taliban.
In reality, that is fantasy. The Taliban lied and cheated when Bill Clinton tried to negotiate. The problem is that in U.S. outreach they see not a desire for compromise, but weakness to exploit. Nor was it ever correct for proponents of withdrawal to say that Al Qaeda is on the run. Quite the contrary: Al Qaeda and even the Islamic State are resurgent in Afghanistan. Victory must be the defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the ability of the Afghan government to control its territory in its entirety.
Trump was absolutely correct to talk about a conditions-based approach, but he still needs to define those conditions beyond simply eradicating enemies. What are the metrics? And will U.S. troops be necessary after victory is achieved to prevent backsliding?
Third, while Trump specifically declined to mention troop numbers, this ultimately cannot be a secret.
Deployments do not occur in secret. Troop numbers need to be based on a strategy for victory as Trump implied and not on political calculations. Compromise here will not be a virtue. When confronted by a hornets’ nest, there are two good options: leave it alone or get rid of it; the worst option is to compromise and lightly tap it with a stick. Congress must also cease treating national security as a political game. They criticized Bush for diverting troops away from Afghanistan to wage war in Iraq. Intellectual consistency then mandates support for far greater numbers of troops in Afghanistan since the U.S. is no longer engaged in Iraq as it was during the Bush administration.
Fourth, Trump is correct that nation-building should not be the U.S. goal. Television cameras don’t lie, but they also don’t tell the whole truth. Terrorism is a problem that impacts thousands, but corruption impacts millions. Countries develop and build at their own rate. The chief result of nation-building programs under Bush and Obama has been to spark corruption which corrodes security.
Fifth, Trump was correct that victory is not possible with Pakistan playing a double game.
Objectively speaking, Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. As I show in Dancing With the Devil, a history of U.S. engagement with rogue regimes, decades of co-opting Pakistan with incentives has backfired. Indeed, the Pakistani government has an incentive not to defeat terrorism because it collects billions of dollars in security assistance so long as the problem remains. Trump is right to call out Pakistan and recognize the U.S. interests lie more with India.
But, how will this play out? It’s time to coerce Pakistan by telling Islamabad that the U.S. will offer new platforms and greater military technology to India unless Pakistan plays ball. The question left unanswered by Trump is how to handle logistics if Pakistan no longer plays ball.
Trump also placed great faith in training efforts for the Afghan Security Forces, but the recent U.S. track record of training Iraqi, Syrian, and Afghan forces is poor. It is not clear the Pentagon has ever conducted an honest assessment of its errors on this issue, especially because the hagiography of prominent generals like David Petraeus and Martin Dempsey would be at risk if they did. And, while it is fashionable to bash democratization, the problem with anointing strongmen is that absent the accountability of elections, they can easily turn on their sponsors and their people.
Nevertheless, Trump’s speech surpasses expectations. Let us hope that his attention, that of his administration, and Congress will be sustained. Too much is at stake for the United States to fail.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.
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