On Dec. 26, 1991 the Soviet Union was formally dissolved after Mikhail Gorbachev resigned on Christmas Day. As the satellite states became independent and Moscow’s power shrunk, the bipolar world was at last, it seemed, unified.
But 27 years later, a growing dispute between the U.S. and China threatens to tip the world towards a new divide, a narrative supported by increasing talk of a “cold war.”
Beijing is a far different threat from Soviet-era Moscow. And the world is a far different place than it was at the end of World War II. Here are three important differences between China and the USSR and how they should shape our response.
First, in the aftermath of a global war born out of a failure to secure lasting peace, the U.S. and its allies were invested in rebuilding, fostering economic prosperity and forging the international bonds meant to stave off further conflict. The United States invested in the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and reconstructed Japan as a democratic industrial powerhouse. The U.S.’s investment in the United Nations and NATO meant that allies, although not always in agreement, were valued. Those relationships—in Western and Central Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America—formed a bulwark against the threat of communism. With few exceptions, members of both parties from Harry Truman to George H.W. Bush sought to strengthen these alliances.
Today, the United States pursues increasingly isolationist policy and champions “America First.” Old allies are met with hostility in negotiating trade deals, faced with slights during formal meetings and threatened with tariffs. Potential partners are mocked by the president and asked what they can give to the U.S. In short, the very alliances that were the backbone of success against communism are rapidly corroding.
Second, Stalin’s USSR was tightly bound to ideology. Communism, not merely a nationalist agenda, drove domestic and foreign policy and guided the economy. Despite revisions and reforms, that ideological commitment to communism as a social and economic model persisted. That model left little room for economic opening up and fostered an ideological “us” verses “them” approach.
But modern China, for all of its ideological rhetoric, is driven less by ideology than by a desire for cultural influence and economic prosperity. Since reform and opening up in the 1970’s, a thriving and modernized economy has replaced communism as the basis for the ruling Communist Party’s claim to political legitimacy. In foreign and domestic policy, that leaves Beijing with much more flexibility to pursue its myriad interests – so long as they are profitable.
Finally, the USSR pursued and enforced its control of satellite states with military might, often dictating policy. Within the communist bloc, the Soviets spent vast amounts of resources to maintain control, monitor dissents, and quash dissent. Abroad, Moscow tried to keep military spending apace with that of the U.S. despite wide economic differences. That meant that to rival the USSR, the U.S. with its much more prosperous economy, outspent its adversary, driving its economy into a ditch.
China has also expanded its global reach, but by purchasing political influence – often through debt. Chinese state-sponsored industry has made deals for the takeover of key strategic assets, like a port in Sri Lanka, a dam in Ecuador, or a railway in Nigeria. These deals are far less apparent than Soviet tanks rolling into Czechoslovakia. But they provide China with a wide network of resources, markets, infrastructure and political allies that the Soviets would envy. With its market economy and participation in organizations like the World Trade Organization, Beijing is also better able to capitalize on global markets. That influence, built primarily upon deals rather than arms, is much more difficult to outspend or challenge, once entrenched. The enduring impact of a port owned by another country or the environmental damage of a dam in jungle paid for with below-market rate oil deprive countries of their most profitable resources and plunges them into domestic turmoil that cannot be fixed by ousting heads of state and sanctioning Chinese officials.
For the U.S., these differences mean that talk of a new cold war does not accurately capture the rising challenge from China. Easily falling into what we know, and comparing it to a war already won, leaves us unprepared, given the starkly different nature of the challenge presented by Beijing than our old adversary, Moscow.
Instead, we would do far better to recognize China as a different sort of threat and prepare to meet it. Allies should be kept close and new partnerships actively courted. The U.S. also should use China’s lack of ideological commitment to its advantage, working to promote free and fair trade with the country through organizations like the World Trade Organization and pressure the country to honor commitments already made. Additionally, Washington should actively engage countries susceptible to bad, debt-heavy investments from China while actively planning for a China that commands a growing reach when it comes to trade, military preparedness and international governing bodies.
None of these measures alone will likely dissuade Beijing from its current practices, but together they would serve as a deterrent.
