President Trump has invited the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia to the White House on June 27 to resolve their long-standing dispute over Kosovo’s final status. The minisummit will be presided over by Richard Grenell, Trump’s special envoy for the dialogue. Grenell has urged an accelerated resolution to the conflict, thus setting the stage for a dramatic Balkan summer.
Three questions will need to be answered if talks between Kosovo and Serbia are to produce concrete results: the purpose, the participants, and the mediators. The new government in Pristina, Kosovo, is consistent with its predecessors in its approach to the talks. Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti has outlined his government’s platform, underscoring that Kosovo will not negotiate its independent statehood or territorial integrity. He also asserted that any agreement must result in reciprocal recognition, enabling both countries to coexist peacefully.
In stark contrast, Belgrade seeks the revocation of Kosovo’s statehood by placing the country under Serbian jurisdiction, especially in its foreign and security policy. Such a move could only be achieved under immense international pressure and would provoke widespread and explosive resistance in Kosovo. It would also contradict U.S. policy, which recognizes Kosovo as a fully independent state that qualifies for U.N. membership.
In sum, the White House-led negotiations will not “normalize” relations between the two Balkan neighbors unless they both acknowledge each other as separate states. Without equal status between two negotiating parties, Belgrade’s unilateral nonrecognition will continue to generate regional uncertainty and potential instability. This will also expose the Western Balkans to more intensive Russian subversion. For the Putin regime, promoting division and conflict serves its geopolitical goals by preventing NATO and EU enlargement.
A second urgent question revolves around who will lead the Kosovo delegation to Washington. According to Hoti, the dialogue must be led by the prime minister, in line with the Kosovo Constitution, and President Hashim Thaci has signaled that he will comply. They may decide to visit the White House together to present a united front. This would counter the strategy of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who prefers to deal exclusively with Thaci. Thaci had previously hinted that he may accept land swaps in exchange for Kosovo’s recognition. Belgrade has pitched the territorial option to encourage political conflicts in Kosovo, pitting president against prime minister. In practice, neither government will accept any loss of territory.
The question of international mediation has become the third problem in the upcoming dialogue. Washington is frustrated by the slow progress of the European Union in restarting the talks and for failing to push both sides toward resolution. Brussels is fearful that the United States may convince the protagonists to sign an agreement that could seriously destabilize the region by including border changes and encourage other states to demand more territory from their neighbors.
The EU does not want to be sidelined in the upcoming talks and has appointed former Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak as special representative to give fresh momentum for its own arbitration. However, Lajcak’s appointment has divided the Kosovar leadership, with Thaci refusing to acknowledge his mediating role. This can place Pristina at loggerheads with the EU, but the onus is also on Brussels to play a constructive role by leaning on the five EU countries (including Slovakia) that have still not recognized Kosovo’s statehood to change their stance.
The White House seems determined to push through with an agreement and present it as a significant foreign policy success during the U.S. presidential elections. Such a strategy will only work if Grenell can convince Serbia to accept Kosovo’s statehood or no longer block the country’s entry into international institutions. Simultaneously, he can persuade Pristina to recognize Serbian Orthodox buildings as internationally protected sites and allow for a decentralized association of municipalities for the Serbian minority, forming less than 8% of Kosovo’s population.
Otherwise, the most important question will focus on what happens if no agreement is reached during the summer. Will the White House simply walk away from the negotiations and leave the dispute to the EU, or will it carry through on the threat of withdrawing the remaining American troops from Kosovo, where they provide an essential anchor of stability? Grenell has already pushed for a major U.S. military drawdown in Germany, and Kosovo may be next on his agenda.
Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington. His recent book, co-authored with Margarita Assenova, is titled Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks.
