The Biden administration remains committed to rejoining the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, offering Tehran an ever-increasing pot of concessions. While analysts and politicians debate that deal’s nonproliferation merits, what is certain is that a new deal would send tens of billions of dollars into Iranian coffers.
Iranian leaders already signal that they plan to apply that windfall to their military rather than to ease the life of ordinary Iranians. The Islamic Republic maintains two militaries: the regular army, charged with territorial defense, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, charged with the protection of the revolution. The regular army includes both the ground forces, navy, air force, and air defense force that is in charge of Iran’s anti-aircraft missiles. The IRGC also has a ground force and navy, the elite Quds Force, and an aerospace force.
The weak link in both militaries has always been the aerial component. Iran’s jet fighters are outdated, if not obsolete. While the shah aspired to make Iran a first-world power, the revolution interrupted the acquisition of his air force. Many of Iran’s platforms date to pre-revolutionary days. Iran is the only country that still flies F-14s, which the U.S. Navy retired more than 15 years ago. Iran’s F-14s are its more modern fighters; the Islamic Republic is also the last country to fly the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II for combat purposes. Manufacture of that plane, first flown in 1958, ended more than four decades ago. Iran’s Russian and Chinese planes are likewise dated. Russia ceased manufacturing its Sukhoi Su-24s more than 30 years ago, and its MiG-29s are now more than 40 years old. The Chinese-built Chengdu J-7s, a version of the MiG-21, are not much better.
Every year, Iran’s air force shrinks. It lost many planes during the Iran-Iraq War. An end to manufacturing means it must cannibalize its remaining planes for spare parts. Crashes also take their toll. In May 2022, a J-7 crashed outside of Isfahan, killing two pilots. The following month, Iran’s air force lost an F-14 near Isfahan after its engines failed. Last month, the IRGC lost one of its 10 Su-22s in Shiraz. Three military plane crashes each year appear average for Iran now. While Tehran claims to fly several dozen planes, the reality is less than half are airworthy, and such mishaps cost perhaps 5% of its fleet each year.
This is why the windfall from a renewed Iran nuclear deal cannot come soon enough for Iran. Earlier this week, Army Brig. Gen. Hamid Vahidi announced that “the purchase of Russian Sukhoi-35 fighters is on the agenda … and we hope to get these fourth generation fights in the future.” He continued to expound on the planes’ greater targeting capabilities and endurance.
Those who advocate an end to Iran sanctions argue that such financial restrictions harm ordinary Iranians. While regime diplomats might complain in English, when the regime discusses matters in Persian, it takes a different tack. The reality is any sanctions relief or new investment now will not only allow the Islamic Republic to correct one of its biggest vulnerabilities and be more aggressive throughout the region, but it will also mean a multibillion-dollar windfall for Vladimir Putin’s Russia. While Iranians and Western diplomats might hope that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death would allow the regime to take a more liberal turn, such a deal would cement a decadeslong training and maintenance relationship that would essentially put Iran into a Russian straitjacket regardless of who rules Tehran.
To bail out the Islamic Republic and allow it to reconstitute its air force now would represent strategic malpractice on a scale unprecedented even for the Biden White House.
Michael Rubin (@mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
