One year ago, Venezuela’s National Assembly president, Juan Guaido, assumed the constitutional role of interim president, replacing illegitimate dictator Nicolas Maduro. Washington’s support for Guaido brought multitudes to the streets and helped him gain diplomatic recognition from some 60 countries. It seemed as though Maduro had met his match as the full weight of U.S. sanctions and diplomatic isolation piled on his regime in an attempt to force a political transition.
In a stunning about-face that shows Maduro’s resilience, U.S. diplomats recently endorsed negotiations and elections. As if the “maximum pressure” campaign of 2019 had never happened, the peremptory calls that “Maduro must go” have faded. Essentially, the leverage gained by U.S. sanctions has been squandered by diplomats who failed to understand the toughness of their foes and the weakness of their allies. Unauthorized outreach to Maduro and his top cronies by President Trump’s lawyer Rudy Giuliani and by Academi (formerly Blackwater) founder Erik Prince injected further ambiguity into an already muddled U.S. strategy.
Worse, Washington’s reversal was poorly timed.
Recently, Maduro’s bloc and a handful of opposition traitors staged a vote in the National Assembly to topple Guaido, as National Guardsmen used brute force to bar entry to Guaido and his backers. The regime’s ham-handed attempt, replete with bribes and lacking a legislative quorum, laid bare the Maduro regime’s authoritarianism. Even the leftist governments of Argentina and Mexico denounced the brazen fraud. The European Union set aside its resistance to sanctions and opened a debate on ratcheting up the pressure. It was an odd time for U.S. diplomats to endorse a negotiated political solution and elections right after regime thugs assaulted and attempted to gut the opposition.
Putting the strategy in the hands of Venezuelan politicians all too eager to split the difference with Maduro fails to confront the growing national security threat posed by his regime. Maduro has survived another year with the help of external actors, including Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Hezbollah, and Colombian narcoguerrillas, that sustain his criminal regime. China is looking to recoup its $60 billion in loans and investments while Russia enjoys projecting its power on Uncle Sam’s doorstep for the first time in many years. In exchange for a supply of free oil, Cuba imposes discipline among the regime’s leaders and within the military.
For the last year, U.S. diplomats and hard-liners in Guaido’s camp shunned a dialogue with the regime. Unfortunately, they stood by as the weakest elements of the opposition pursued negotiations. Now that Maduro is so self-assured that his regime has little interest in dialogue, U.S. strategy has turned to negotiations. Maduro will use this upper hand to demand sanctions relief, and, as always, some in the so-called opposition are ready to accommodate him.
A trail of ill-fated negotiations with Maduro has failed to extract serious concessions and provided the regime with breathing room. Washington’s newfound confidence in negotiations as the best path toward a political transition must be paired with red lines and the desire to press forward with tough measures to protect U.S. security. For example, Maduro cannot be allowed to preside over elections or a political transition. The National Assembly should designate tough, trustworthy negotiators. And U.S. sanctions targeting regime leaders, as well as schemes involving Venezuelan bonds or bloated aid proposals, should be off the table as forms of compromise.
Simultaneously, the United States should continue to weaken Maduro by expanding sanctions beyond the licit economy and snuffing out Venezuela’s illicit trade in oil, drugs, and gold. U.S. agencies must move more decisively to bring the hammer down on new conspiracies by the Maduro regime, often involving Russia, Turkey, and China, to evade sanctions or to earn hard currency. By issuing indictments against senior Venezuelan officials who have been under investigation for many years, the U.S. could further expose the narcostate.
U.S. law enforcement agencies and security forces should cooperate with regional allies, particularly their Colombian and Brazilian counterparts, to jointly patrol land and maritime borders and effectively quarantine lawless Venezuela. Sustained security operations aimed at capturing fugitives and choking off shipments of illegal drugs, which have doubled in the last year, and illegally mined gold will cut off a vital source of revenue for the regime.
These measures could weaken Maduro’s hand before (and during) any negotiations, which his government has yet to formally accept, anyways, because it is confident in its position. Preconditions for any talks must be ironclad, not drawn rhetorically but then loosened in practice. The costs of failure are mounting quickly in Venezuela, and blessing a negotiated settlement and elections without a deeper strategy to protect and preserve U.S. interests risks handing Maduro and our enemies another “mandate.”
Roger F. Noriega (@rogernoriegaUSA) was U.S. ambassador to the OAS and assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs from 2001-05. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and his firm, Vision Americas, represents U.S. and foreign clients. Ryan C. Berg (@RyanBergPhD) is an AEI research fellow, where he focuses on Latin America foreign policy and security issues.
