On Sunday, Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah pledged his participation in retaliation for the January 2020 U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Soleimani was killed alongside an Iranian proxy leader.
Nasrallah made his threat during Iranian orchestrated mass memorials to Soleimani. The Hezbollah operated Al Manar news website described how Nasrallah “stressed, as [Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei] said, the just retribution of the killers… who ordered and implemented [Soleimani’s killing], although it was the responsibility of the Iranians and Iraqis in the first place, [was also] the responsibility of all free and honorable peoples to be a partner in the implementation of retribution.”
There are two particularly noteworthy comments here.
For a start, we have Nasrallah’s explicit endorsement of Khamenei’s insistence that “retribution” for Soleimani include those “who ordered and implemented” the killing. This part and parcel as to why, as I reported, Congress has authorized the extension of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s Diplomatic Security Service protective detail. Iran-centric threats are also set to inform President Trump’s post-January 20th Secret Service protection. Considering Hezbollah’s penchant for assassinations and its historic legacy of attacks on U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in Lebanon, Nasrallah’s words bear note.
Then, there’s the “responsibility” of “honorable peoples to be a partner in the implementation of retribution.” This is a surprisingly explicit warning that Hezbollah will assist Iran in carrying out any retaliation. The situating of retribution in a matter of honor is a strong indication of the theological envelope, which defines Iran’s attitude towards avenging Soleimani. But Hezbollah’s amenability to retribution poses thee specific concerns for U.S. interests.
First, it would appear to end the relative detente in Hezbollah-U.S. political interactions that have sustained over the past 12 years. While the United States (primarily through the CIA) and Hezbollah have engaged in action, including combat, against each other during this period, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut has been relatively confident its personnel would not face targeting. In part, this is down to the U.S. understanding of how overstretched Hezbollah has become due to its support for Bashar Assad in the Syrian Civil War. Nasrallah’s words must now alter the U.S. threat assessment.
Second, there’s the additional intelligence challenge that will come with monitoring Hezbollah’s specific threat to U.S. interests. While the U.S. has excellent intelligence coverage of Iranian weapons flows and IRGC threat vectors, it has less insight into Hezbollah plots. Part of the challenge is that Hezbollah already has vast stockpiles of various weapons, including military-grade explosives, on Lebanese soil. It doesn’t need Iranian supplies to blow up the U.S. ambassador. Hezbollah’s best operatives are also well-trained in operational security, mitigating their vulnerability to U.S. detection. The Israeli Mossad intelligence service will be instrumental in assisting the U.S. in detecting and disrupting future Hezbollah threats.
The political level also matters. Khamenei and the IRGC might gamble that a Hezbollah-centric retaliation against U.S. interests offers Tehran at least a degree of separation from any follow-on U.S. retaliation. That, following any Hezbollah attack on U.S. interests, the Biden administration would look at Lebanon’s already highly-fragile political situation and opt against significant retaliation in fear of sparking a second civil war in that nation. Iran is aware that the Biden administration wants to rapidly reconstruct the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord. It expects a far more concessionary U.S. policy toward it after Jan. 20. History comes into play here. Iran took a dangerous lesson from the Obama administration’s utterly impotent response to the IRGC’s 2011 attempt to blow up the Cafe Milano restaurant in Washington, D.C. Namely, that the administration of which Biden was a very senior figure, would tolerate an attempted act of war on American soil.
Put simply, Nasrallah’s words should not be discounted as standard fare ranting.
