Having failed to establish a detente that would keep relations calm through the November elections, China is warning that the Trump administration’s policy toward Beijing might lead to war.
Take what Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of China’s preeminent western-focus propaganda outlet, had to say on Friday. Writing in the Global Times, Hu observed that “the US should be reminded to distance itself from China’s core interests. Don’t play with fire off China’s coast, don’t really stir up conflict over Taiwan question, and don’t overdo it in the South China Sea. If the Trump administration just wants to create China-U.S. tensions to help his re-election campaign, and is not really ready for a military showdown, then be careful for the next few months, and don’t go too far.”
A loyal servant of the government Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Hu’s words are closely reflective of Beijing’s thinking. Hu went further. “My suggestion,” he said, “is that under no circumstances should the Chinese military fire the first shot. But I am confident that China will be well prepared to fire a second shot as a response to the first shot. On core interests, China will not back off. China’s stance is clear to all.”
On paper, this push not to fire the first shot looks relatively moderate. But that perception is misguided. China has learned from the Russian example of so-called grey zone warfare, involving actions that threaten U.S. personnel in ways that fall short of lethal attacks. In the South China Sea, this Chinese activity centers on tactics such as shining laser beams into the cockpits of U.S. aircraft and conducting dangerous fighter jet interceptions of those aircraft. This allows China to threaten American interests without explicitly firing the first shot. But as tensions ratchet upward, it is eminently feasible that the U.S. military might take proactive defensive action. Consider the risk, for example, of a Chinese anti-air missile system locking onto a transiting U.S. aircraft. Does the aircraft defend itself by launching weapons against that Chinese system, or does it wait in the hope that China is bluffing? This is just one example, but it speaks to the thin and time-sensitive line between defensive and offensive action.
There’s another point that informs why China is sending out messages such as Hu’s. Namely, that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s regime is at once increasingly powerful and immensely paranoid. These two dynamics exist in a symbiotic sense, with Xi fearing that his unwillingness to employ China’s national power might undermine his credibility as a leader. This is a hypersensitive concern for Xi, who has situated himself as a near-divine leader destined to establish China as the world’s sole superpower (divine, in that Chinese domestic media occasionally shows a smiling Xi floating through clouds).
From Xi and the Standing Committee’s perspective, U.S. visits to Taiwan, patrols through the South China Sea, and bans of Chinese technology companies, are all part of a U.S. effort to destroy the Communist Party. Existential threats. While the actual U.S. intent, here, is not destruction, but rather the constraint of Chinese challenges to the U.S.-led international order, it is Xi’s perception rather than the reality, which guides Beijing’s policy.
Hence the threats of war and growing risks of miscalculation. If Xi decides his leadership narrative is at risk, anything, including war, is possible.
