On the back of a disastrous weekend visit by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang (the North Koreans spent the visit insulting Pompeo in their state media outlets), it is clear that negotiations towards dismantling Kim Jong Un’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are failing.
They are failing because North Korea believes it can extract concessions without regard for U.S. interests. Correspondingly, getting real doesn’t simply require the president to get tougher on the North Koreans, it demands his recognition of what the North Koreans view as their key interests and key vulnerabilities. Trump seems oblivious to this reality. Tweeting on Monday, Trump suggested that Kim will give up his programs because the two leaders … shook hands.
I have confidence that Kim Jong Un will honor the contract we signed &, even more importantly, our handshake. We agreed to the denuclearization of North Korea. China, on the other hand, may be exerting negative pressure on a deal because of our posture on Chinese Trade-Hope Not!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) July 9, 2018
While Trump is right to challenge China here — which had until recently been acting constructively on North Korea (and is now, as Trump knows from his intelligence briefings, playing games) — his reliance on Kim’s word is terribly dangerous. After all, the North Korean dictator cares nothing for honor or words, only for outcomes that maximize his interests and mitigate his vulnerabilities. Trump must master the balance between offering Kim his interests and seizing against his vulnerabilities, because the current U.S. strategy is way out of balance.
North Korea is refusing to allow international inspectors onto its soil, it is continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile research and development, and it is now openly insulting Pompeo. This situation cannot co-exist with removing North Korea’s nuclear-armed missile threat to America.
So what should Trump do in specific terms? He should threaten sanctions against Kim’s Chinese and Russian foreign capital facilitators, order the Navy to move assets in readiness for a blockade of North Korea (the Navy is stretched and thus needs added time to prepare), and to resume full spectrum planning for military strikes on North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities.
Yet, the president should also show a greater flexibility in how he talks about North Korea’s nuclear program. While the U.S. cannot accept a North Korea that is churning out nuclear warheads, the U.S. could live with a North Korea that retains a small number of warheads but gives up its ballistic missile program. That balance would give Kim the sense of security that he almost certainly desires as his number one priority while removing his long-range strike capability against the U.S.
This new approach would represent a realist foreign policy of balanced interests and vulnerabilities.
