The Supreme Court should accept the request by Brendan Dassey’s legal team to hear his appeal.
While Dassey’s name rose to public prominence following a 2015 Netflix documentary, “Making a Murderer,” the central issue here is the necessary provision of new legal guidance on police interrogations of juveniles.
That’s because Dassey was 16 years-old when he was interrogated by police investigating the 2005 murder of 25 year-old Teresa Halbach. Dassey and his uncle, Steven Avery, were later convicted of Halbach’s murder and sentenced to life in prison.
Yet beyond the critical need to ensure Halbach’s life and fate is not forgotten, the exigent legal issue is whether a minor, as Dassey was at the time, can be interrogated by police officers in the absence of an adult or attorney. It’s an important issue for the nation’s top court in that many states continue to allow police interrogations even where minors are alone.
Moreover, even where a parent gives consent for police interrogation — as with Dassey — other questions remain.
Consider the opinion of the three dissenting judges in the 4-3 Federal Appeals court ruling against Dassey last year. They assert that, “The Due Process Clause and the right against self‐incrimination demand that, in order to be admissible in evidence, a suspect’s confession must be voluntary. Dassey’s was not. Because the detectives used coercive interrogation tactics on an intellectually disabled juvenile, Dassey’s will was overborne during his March 1 interrogation. Without this involuntary and highly unreliable confession, the case against Dassey was almost nonexistent.”
Their logic and legal rationale may or may not be correct, but their questions are legitimate and demand the Supreme Court’s scrutiny.
But that’s not all.
Because Dassey’s case also raises the question of what constitutes “custody” in the situation of a child. After all, Dassey was originally interrogated in a family residence rather than at a police station and thus was not technically in police custody. The distinction matters in that interrogations outside of custody do not require police officers to provide an individual with a “Miranda” guidance on their rights to remain silent and seek counsel from an attorney — although they did so in this case.
Regardless, another important question follows: can a minor reliably make the distinction between when he or she is in custody or free to terminate an interview?
As I say, the Supreme Court should take on these questions. In my personal opinion, police should not be able to interrogate those under 18 years of age unless the minor is accompanied by a responsible adult — though not necessarily an attorney, unless requested by the adult or minor — who can advise them.
