Challenging Boris Johnson at Prime Minister’s Questions on Wednesday, Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer asked the prime minister why he had not yet sanctioned the major Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich. Johnson responded that it was “not appropriate for me to comment on individual cases at this stage.” Johnson then shifted the topic onto broader sanctions against the Kremlin.
His response underlines the British government’s continuing hesitation about truly confronting Vladimir Putin’s most important oligarchs.
It represents a marked difference from Britain’s otherwise robust strategy in support of Ukraine. Determined to advance his vision of a post-Brexit “Global Britain” that stands for democratic security and values, Johnson led the West’s delivery of anti-tank and anti-air weapons to Ukraine prior to Russia’s invasion. Johnson and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appear to have built a genuinely close relationship.
Still, even as he has announced major sanctions against Russian banks, airlines and the formation of a counter-kleptocracy task force, Johnson is allowing most of Putin’s U.K.-resident oligarchs the space and time to protect their assets.
The real estate baron Mikhail Fridman, for example, has now resigned from the board of the Holland & Barrett health food retailer he owns. Offering only a tentative lament over the war in Ukraine at a London press conference on Tuesday, Fridman refused to directly criticize Putin. Instead, he complained of unfair treatment against his business interests by Western authorities.
There’s also Abramovich, who has chosen to sell off the Chelsea soccer club. He says that any net profit will go to Ukraine-related charities. This PR-savvy emphasis on charity allows Abramovich to define “net profit” as he sees fit. Abramovich will thus be able to protect his Western financial footing against future sanctions. Abramovich’s links to Putin are hardly secret, either — he once affectionately implied that Putin is a half-boss, half-older-brother figure to him. Notably, however, the man hired to supervise Abramovich’s sale of Chelsea says he’s “not going to rush anything.” It seems clear that Abramovich believes he can mitigate his U.K. losses.
Johnson’s approach to individual sanctions stands in contrast with that of the European Union. The EU has responded to the invasion by sanctioning a number of oligarchs close to Putin’s regime. Two names stand out.
The EU describes the familiar Fridman as an “enabler of Putin’s inner circle” who has cultivated “strong ties” to the Russian leader. (Fridman has also faced accusations of organized crime activity in Spain.) Similarly, Alisher Usmanov is named as a “pro-Kremlin oligarch with particularly close ties” to Putin. The EU notes that Usmanov is suspected of providing corrupt payments to senior Russian government officials. Like Abramovich, Usmanov is also heavily involved in the top flight of English soccer, previously owning Arsenal and now a major backer of Everton.
Usmanov was sanctioned by the U.K. on Thursday, but only after the EU took noticeable action. It seems that Johnson’s government decided they had to show at least a tentative sign of more robust sanctions against the oligarchs.
The sanctions matter for a simple reason. Namely, it is through the patronage of these billionaire oligarch conduits that Putin finds his ability to receive and distribute largesse. This largesse filters through the Russian financial system and is a key ingredient in the loyalty of Putin’s notorious security apparatus.
That brings us back to Johnson.
While the oligarchs’ proximate links to Putin are well known to the British intelligence services, successive U.K. governments have decided that the financial benefit of their economic investments outweigh any legal and security costs. Abramovich, Fridman, and Usmanov have also greatly benefited from English defamation law, which places a heavy evidentiary burden on journalists rather than on the public figure suing in court. This stands in contrast to U.S. protections for investigative reporting. Fridman, for example, lost a 2005 defamation suit in federal court, which included references to his reported links to drug trafficking and Russian organized crime.
Abramovich, Fridman, and Usmanov are all renowned for their legal efforts to pressure media outlets to avoid or delete negative reporting. Usmanov’s public relations team is also suspected of regularly editing his Wikipedia page to remove undesirable material.
The problem goes beyond restrictions on the media and Johnson himself. The links between his Conservative Party and Russian in London are enduring and well-established. Indeed, they were hardly affected even by the 2018 assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal by Russian intelligence officers. As a result of that attack, an innocent Briton died and a police officer was seriously wounded.
Yet the exigent risk born of Johnson’s hesitant approach is clear. Witnessing their continued ability to protect assets and position within British high society, Putin’s oligarchs will view this moment as a temporary rupture to their otherwise firm British foundation. So also will Putin.
