The problem with U.S.-North Korea relations is that we are just not aggressive enough. At least, that’s what former national security adviser John Bolton claimed in a new interview with Axios. “The idea that we are somehow exerting maximum pressure on North Korea is just unfortunately not true,” Bolton said, arguing the Trump administration should “be pursuing a different course.”
And what would that course be? Beyond a proposal to intercept illegal oil transfers, Bolton was vague. The foreign policy hawk didn’t spell out his preferred approach, but it isn’t difficult to guess based on his past statements: Bolton wants President Trump to wage preventive war and wants the United States to attack North Korea. This, of course, is madness. It could lead to nuclear conflict and would undoubtedly lead to the loss of millions of lives.
Still, there’s one point on which Bolton is correct: Trump does need to do something different.
The last month of apprehension about a possible “Christmas gift” in the form of a missile testing or other provocation from North Korea makes the need for a new strategy evident. (Thankfully, as of writing, the gift seems to have been lost in the mail). Whatever progress was made by Trump’s willingness to talk with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is at risk of being undone thanks to diplomatic stagnation and mutual provocation.
But though his diagnosis is basically right, Bolton’s remedy is dangerously wrong. The whole point of engagement with North Korea is to avoid an unnecessary war that’s high death toll and catastrophic consequences would quite literally change the course of history. Initiating precisely the conflict we are trying to prevent is mindbogglingly irresponsible and foolish. Starting what would likely become the world’s second nuclear war benefits no one, the United States included.
Realist diplomacy remains a better option, at once more strategic and humane. This approach has three key elements.
First, it requires a shift in focus away from dramatic, top-level summits between Trump, Kim, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in and a movement toward working-level talks. This means eschewing photo-ops and ultimately unenforceable denuclearization pledges in exchange for something much closer to normalized diplomatic relations. No more games of telephone through Sweden or other intermediaries. Drop the silly pantomime that shapes current communications between Washington, Pyongyang, and Seoul and let the slow work of practical diplomacy happen.
That will only be possible with the second needed shift: the rejection of complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization as a near-term goal.
Kim’s regime has made abundantly clear this is not on the table for the foreseeable future. Kim views nuclear weapons as his sole reliable protection against forcible, external regime change, particularly by the United States. He will not surrender his arsenal so long as he believes that regime change is a plausible threat, and it will take years, maybe even decades, of talks, normalized economic interaction, and peace on the Korean Peninsula to change his threat perception. Holding out for complete denuclearization in the meantime makes diplomatic failure a certainty.
Instead, in a third shift, Washington must pursue more limited, attainable aims that can provide a solid basis for peace and maybe, eventually, denuclearization of Korea.
This might begin with the retraction of U.S. sanctions affecting North Korean civilian quality of life, continued repatriation of U.S. troop remains from the Korean War, reconnection of road and railroad infrastructure between North and South Korea, and renewed freedom of travel and economic and cultural exchange between the two Koreas. From there, we should build toward a Korean War peace treaty and a nuclear freeze, or something like it. In all this, South Korea should lead the diplomatic agenda thanks to its unique cultural proximity and greater investment in achieving a peaceful outcome. Complete denuclearization should be, at most, a distant hope.
This approach is possible because there is no rush for the United States. Bolton tried to tell Axios otherwise, claiming time is “on the side of the proliferator,” in this case, North Korea. This is a bad reading of the realities Pyongyang faces. The truth is, no matter the size of Kim’s arsenal of missiles, his nuclear and conventional military strength will always be enormously overshadowed by U.S. military might.
Moreover, Kim knows an unprovoked attack on the United States or allies such as South Korea or Japan would end his regime and likely his life. His entire aim is regime survival, so American military deterrence will function to constrain North Korean aggression indefinitely. Kim’s increasing capabilities are, in this sense, irrelevant, so long as U.S. deterrence keeps him from attacking.
The start of a new decade could be an auspicious moment in U.S.-North Korea relations — if the advice of hawks like Bolton is consistently ignored. Pursuing a different course requires a move toward prudent diplomacy with achievable goals and the safeguard of reliable deterrence. This is the only way we’ll ever have a real shot at lasting peace.
Bonnie Kristian is a fellow at Defense Priorities and contributing editor at The Week. She is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog.
