Mosul has fallen from Islamic State control to a joyous Iraqi government.
It proves something: The battlefield momentum against the Islamic State has now shifted decisively.
Still, this was a hard fight. Around 1,000 Iraqi soldiers lost their lives in Mosul, and many more were wounded.
It’s also important to note that while this victory was likely, it was never certain. Back in March, international activists came close to slowing down the operation under the (misguided) pretense of protecting civilian lives. Fortunately, they were ignored.
Yet Mosul’s difficulties are far from over.
On the contrary, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi now faces an even tougher challenge. He must counter Iran’s political usurpation of Iraq, and build a consensus in Mosul that reflects the city’s multisectarian tradition.
After all, Mosul is now divided between various sectarian groups.
First up, are the Iranian-led Shiite militias. Fixed under the umbrella of “popular mobilization forces”, these militias have a penchant for robbing, murdering, and generally abusing Sunni civilians.
That’s a problem for more than moral reasons. Because if the militias are able to act unrestrained, they’ll rapidly alienate Mosul’s Sunni population away from the Iraqi government. Unfortunately, recent attacks in Tehran make the risk of militia sectarian retaliation particularly great. But if that happens, Sunnis will resort to the Islamic State as a means of their own self-defense. Further complicating matters is the fact that the Islamic State knows this, and will seek to incite the militias into abuses.
Then there are the Kurdish militias. These groups, though American allies, retain major territorial ambitions in northern Iraq. And unless corralled, they will seek control over Mosul and spark sectarian fighting with Sunnis.
As such, to prevent Mosul’s political decline into renewed chaos, the Trump administration will have to double down on Abadi. That will require providing Abadi whatever support he needs to deter sectarian movements. To be clear, this may need to involve U.S. covert action against Shiite militias and Iran. The key to Mosul’s future, and Iraq more generally, is the political isolation of both ISIS and Iran.
Of course, Mosul’s people have more basic needs than those of politics. The ruined city will need a great humanitarian effort if it is to be rebuilt. But it will also need government and NGO action to ensure the provision of basic living supplies: the risk of contaminated water supplies is a central concern here. But rife corruption in Iraq’s utility and sanitation services means that this will be easier said than done.
Nevertheless, we shouldn’t delude ourselves. Mosul’s liberation does not reflect the end of the Islamic State in Iraq. In other Iraqi settlements, the moral and strategic urgency of liberation continues to be obvious.
And in that regard, as I’ll explain later, our attention must now shift to Iraq’s border town with Syria, Al Qa’im.
