Be wary of British generals on Iran

In 2007, as the U.S. Army and Marine Corps escalated operations under the “surge” strategy, the British Army in southern Iraq pulled back. Under attack from Iranian-supported militias around their Basra strongholds, the British alternated between occasional patrol operations and cutting deals. Predictably, this only fed the appetite of the primary Shia militia in Basra at that time, the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. Supported by Iran at that time (although no longer), Sadr kept harassing the British into acquiescing to his control over Basra. By January 2008, the British had withdrawn from their city palace base in Basra to the airport. There they would stay as self-imposed prisoners until the total withdrawal of U.K. conventional forces from Iraq in 2009. It was an embarrassing defeat that greatly agitated junior British officers, who felt their hands were tied. It also required a joint U.S.-Iraqi operation in 2008 to retake Basra from Sadr.

There are a couple of caveats here. British Special Forces were instrumental in operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and against Iranian-supported militias to include the Mahdi Army. That service has rightly been recognized by the promotion of some of their officers to the top ranks of the British military. And Britain’s CIA equivalent intelligence service, the SIS, has long conducted valuable operations against Iran. Unfortunately, their aggression was not matched by British commanders of conventional forces in Iraq.

Still, post-2003 history of the British Army in Iraq gives us cause to judge cautiously the words of British Army generals on Iran. Evidencing as much, the British have since walked back Ghika’s comments. On Thursday, they raised their threat level in the Middle East.

[Also read: Democrat backs British general on Iran over ‘pathological liar’ Trump]