In Seoul on Monday, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea met with Gen. Joe Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On paper, all was not well between Moon and President Trump’s top military advisor.
Shortly before the meeting, Moon argued that “There must be no more war on the Korean Peninsula. Whatever ups and downs we face, the North Korean nuclear situation must be resolved peacefully.” This definitive statement was designed to contrast with Trump’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric on North Korea.
Notably however, Gen. Dunford pushed back against Moon. “Our job,” Dunford said, “is to make sure our leadership has a [military] option available to them. I believe there are two things we are clear about: one, our responsibility to defend against attack, two, our requirement to make sure we have a decisive response in the event of attack.” Dunford also affirmed that the U.S. has “viable military options in the event that the diplomatic and economic pressurization campaign fails.”
To the BBC and others, the difference in tone between Moon, Dunford, and Trump indicates “worsening tension” between the U.S. and South Korea.
I disagree.
I think that what we’re seeing here is a coordinated “good cop, bad cop” routine in action.
As I noted in July, by applying two unified but diverse strategies to North Korea, the U.S. and South Korea lend greater strength to diplomatic efforts. The crucial element here is that North Korea understands it has the option between an agreement and associated benefits, and a conflict or war it cannot win. Just as Moon’s pleasant tone lends credibility to his peace offerings, so does Trump’s rhetoric lend credibility to his threats.
Moreover, South Korea’s overt diplomatic stance helps facilitate negotiations between Trump and China over North Korea. Neither Trump nor President Xi Jinping of China wish to lose face over North Korea, but both know that their shared compromise will eventually be crucial. By acting as an intermediary, South Korea can take the first steps toward negotiation without compromising Trump’s position.
Ultimately, the U.S. will likely have to accept North Korea’s retained nuclear program, in return for its cessation of its intercontinental ballistic missile and ballistic missile submarine programs. In turn, China will have to force Kim Jong Un to make that concession or lose Chinese support. Again, however, neither China or the U.S. is willing to lose face on the journey to this deal.
South Korea’s “good cop” routine offers the answer.
