Iran has dramatically escalated its rocket attacks on American military and government personnel in Iraq. The Biden administration’s caution against retaliation is emboldening, rather than cooling, this crisis.
On Wednesday, more than a dozen rockets struck a major United States-operated Ain al Asad air base in Anbar province. The U.S. Embassy and a U.S. government facility in Erbil were also targeted. The U.S.’s response?
Basically silence.
In late June, the U.S. launched airstrikes against Iranian proxy forces responsible for previous rocket strikes. Since then, however, the firing has been one-sided. Iran is clearly emboldened. The Biden administration seems to believe that any military response to these attacks would be misguided. It also fears that retaliation would undermine tense negotiations with Iran toward restoring U.S. participation in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear accord. Both assessments are misguided.
Evincing Tehran’s very limited concern that its hand be detected in these attacks, the group claiming responsibility for them calls itself the “Muhandis Revenge Forces.” That’s a not-so-subtle reference to Abu Mahdi al Muhandis. The former leader of a top Iranian proxy in Iraq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Muhandis was killed in a January 2020 airstrike. The same strike eliminated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Regardless, no one doubts that Muhandis was an Iranian puppet. He worked to undermine Iraq’s democratic authority in favor of Iran’s ever-encroaching Islamic revolution. The use of his name as a cover for these rocket strikes should be seen as direct evidence of Iran’s desire to avenge Soleimani with American blood (former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is a priority Iranian target).
But the top line in Iraq is that the Iranian hard-liners feel confident they can escalate against the U.S. without riposte. While the Revolutionary Guard hates the U.S., it recognizes that American political and economic influence in Baghdad is Iran’s greatest external threat in Iraq. Actions that precipitate a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq are thus in the Revolutionary Guard’s favor.
What do Iraqi politicians think about this situation?
Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi has a nationalist bent, but he appears reluctant to take the kind of robust action necessary to deter Iran’s militias. At the same time, the only domestic political force capable of consolidating Kadhimi against Iran remains largely silent on the rocket attacks. Muqtada al Sadr has previously condemned similar rocket attacks but now appears to be biding his time. Sadr, who has reinvented himself as an Iraqi nationalist separate from Iran’s fiefdom, is likely hesitant about taking action that might jeopardize what he expects to be an extremely strong showing in October parliamentary elections. Sadr’s opportunity takes on added impetus amid growing Iraqi frustrations over a power crisis, legitimately blamed on Iran, that is now rippling through the nation. Time and patience offer an opportunity that Sadr doesn’t want to waste.
In turn, it’s up to President Joe Biden to take action to protect U.S. interests. As with the Russians, the Iranians have absolute respect for the calibrated application of force. If Biden bombs them, they will get back in their box. If not, they will keep attacking until they kill Americans.
