President Trump and Joe Biden couldn’t be any more different in terms of family background, personality, temperament, and worldview. The former is unapologetic, loud, obnoxious, energetic, and blunt. The latter is personable, even-keeled, mild-mannered (depending on the issue) — a politician.
Sure, the political appointees, cabinet secretaries, and policy priorities will change depending on the outcome of the presidential election. But some foreign policy preferences are likely to remain the same regardless of who places his hand on the Bible in January 2021. In Washington, old habits die hard.
These three things are likely to remain constant:
1. The Pentagon budget will remain gigantic: Trump is fond of patting himself on the back for rebuilding the U.S. military, refurbishing the nuclear weapons enterprise, and exporting a whole bunch of advanced American-made military equipment to allies and partners around the world. The Trump administration’s fiscal 2021 defense spending request clocked in at $705 billion, a sum that doesn’t even include the tens of billions of additional dollars that go into other parts of the national security budget.
Regardless of which candidate wins, the Pentagon won’t be hurting for cash. While the coronavirus pandemic and the historic $3.1 trillion deficit will rightly put pressure on all elements of the federal budget, defense is one of those fiefdoms jealously guarded by members of both political parties.
While there may be liberal lawmakers in the Democratic Party prepared to do battle over defense spending (Reps. Barbara Lee and Mark Pocan are reportedly assembling something of a Defense Spending Reduction Caucus to press the message), none of us who believe the Pentagon is a black hole for taxpayer dollars should get his or her hopes up about a big cut. As Biden told the Stars and Stripes newspaper, “I don’t think [budget cuts] are inevitable, but we need priorities in the budget.”
The Democratic presidential nominee isn’t buying big defense spending reductions along the lines of the 10% cut some liberals are advocating. Neither is the Republican presidential nominee. Unfortunately, Washington won’t either.
2. China will be the big, bad wolf: China is the new Russia. By that, I mean that China is now the target that unites Washington as fast as an old-fashioned, high-price fundraiser. Policymakers and senior military officers warning about Beijing’s supposed quest for global domination (talk about threat inflation!) and advocating for a tougher stance against China across the board is now the mainstream position of choice around the Beltway.
Trump and Biden would use different tools to put China down a peg. Trump likes tariffs, sanctions, and arms sales to Taiwan. Biden appreciates diplomatic pressure and alliances. But both men hold the same objective: Coerce Beijing into playing by the rules that have governed the so-called U.S.-dominated global order since World War II.
While the U.S. intelligence community may have fingered China for attempts to denigrate Trump’s reelection campaign, the Chinese Communist Party likely views Trump and Biden as cut from the same cloth — creatures who are indebted to American hegemony.
3. Sanctions will be issued every week: Disgusted by the behavior of a war criminal? Freeze his assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Want to send a message to Russia for interfering in the election or hacking U.S. infrastructure? Issue sanctions and visa bans on high-ranking officials in the Kremlin. Hope to persuade North Korea’s Kim Jong Un into denuclearizing? Pass secondary sanctions on what little North Korean trade is left.
In Washington, passing sanctions into law or making a grand sanctions policy announcement has something for everyone. Lawmakers are able to demonstrate to their constituents back home that they are actually doing something. Policymakers in the executive branch get to go on TV and claim that they are holding bad actors accountable, and the U.S. policy community as a whole can pretend for a day or two that the problem has been solved.
Except that the problem goes on and often persists long after the sanctions are issued. The big dip in Iran’s and Venezuela’s oil exports over the last two years shows how much of an impact U.S. sanctions can have in terms of a government’s finances. But the lack of any concrete change in behavior from either country also illustrates that sanctions are an illusion of success. They make us feel better about ourselves, but they don’t really solve a problem or force an adversary to bend to the American will, particularly if the sanctions aren’t attached to realistic objectives and a diplomatic exit ramp.
This, of course, won’t stop lawmakers from continuing to file dozens of sanctions bills to boost their own credentials.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
