Why did President Trump walk away from Kim Jong Un? Because Trump is challenging the North Korean leader to overrule domestic forces that are skeptical about reaching a grand bargain with America.
Of course, Trump couldn’t say this openly. Instead, as he left Vietnam on Thursday, the president suggested that his decision to leave the summit early was motivated by a more basic concern: Kim’s unrealistic demands for total sanctions relief, and his prevarication on nuclear disarmament. Yes, those issues are real U.S. concerns, but they’re ultimately only concerns in their reflection of the broader North Korean obstacle to a deal: the current negotiating philosophy of the North Korean inner circle.
Kim remains caught between his own interest in detente and economic opening against senior regime officials who believe they can get a sort-of detente and economic windfall without sacrificing the fundamental elements of their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the end, Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo know that Kim must seize the initiative here. They know he has not yet decided how to balance out that equation.
This is not to say that we should lose hope here. The U.S. intelligence community, and at least one other close American ally, believes Kim may well agree to a detente-type super-deal that addressed many U.S. concerns, albeit likely requiring some innovative thinking on nuclear warheads. The problem is that Kim’s senior statesmen are less interested in that deal.
Led by top advisor Kim Yong Chol, other senior officials assume that U.S. sanctions can be diminished over time, and with them, U.S. demands for total denuclearization. The incentives for this belief are significant. After all, North Korean strategy has long been focused, not on economic reform, but rather on reducing the U.S. military footprint in South Korea, extracting economic concessions from South Korea and the U.S., and building a regime survival guarantee in the form of a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile program.
That takes us back to Trump’s decision to walk away. That action means Trump has thrown the ball to Kim Jong Un. While Trump, rightly, was complimentary towards the North Korean leader in his comments, the president also recognizes that Kim Jong Un needs to take the leap here. Only he can choose between endorsing a true grand bargain or deferring to the hardliners’ old pressure-concession strategy. By walking away in such an overt, albeit polite manner, Trump shows Kim Jong Un that the time has come to make a decision.
To be sure, it’s a risky pressure gambit. Kim Jong Un may return home and listen to Kim Yong Chol’s whispers that new missile tests can force America back to the table on friendlier terms. It is, however, worth noting here that Trump asserted on Thursday that Kim Jong Un had pledged not to conduct new tests. That personal pledge is important: It injects a principle of trust into the two men’s dealings. If Kim Jong Un now breaks that trust, Trump will know that the hardliner strategists have won out and it is time to consider other means of North Korean denuclearization.
Regardless, Trump has now shown the North Korean supreme leader that this process is only going to work if he’s fully on board. The summit in Singapore last year was the “get to know” summit, Hanoi was the “time for Kim Jong Un to go big on reform, or go ballistic and face the consequences” summit.
