Jim Mattis may be a military hero, but his diplomatic judgment is like Jimmy Carter’s

Both Democrats and Republicans breathed a sigh of relief when President Trump selected Jim Mattis to be his secretary of defense. Mattis was everything Trump was not— a military hero, a man who led by example, articulate, and a leader famous for loyalty to those under his command. But almost a year and a half into his tenure, Mattis increasingly seems to stake out positions which strengthen rather than neuter U.S. adversaries.

Consider the F-35 sale to Turkey. Members of Congress sought to withhold delivery of the F-35 to Turkey because of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s hostage diplomacy, his flirtation with Russia and Iran, and his support for extremism and terrorist groups. Not only did Mattis vocally oppose any delay in provision of the next generation stealth aircraft to Turkey, but when Congress voted to delay the F-35 transfer, the Pentagon OK’d a transfer ceremony anyway. Perhaps Mattis and his top aides were so myopic to celebrate a bureaucratic victory over Congress (and the White House), but the timing couldn’t be worse: Mattis handed Erdogan a high-profile victory just days before elections which would confirm his strongman status and send the message that the U.S. would back down in the face of Turkish blackmail.

Then there is the dialogue with the Taliban. While the State Department carries that work out, Mattis has been its chief advocate within the Trump administration, harkening back to the stance of former President George W. Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell who never saw a “moderate Taliban” with whom he could not engage. While every administration makes talking to the Taliban seem like something new and fresh, the simple fact is that every administration dating back to Bill Clinton talked to the Taliban. The Taliban promised Team Clinton they would close terror training camps, isolate Osama bin Laden, and end the Afghan civil war. Bill Richardson, Clinton’s ambassador to the United Nations, even claimed he had successfully brokered a peace deal after he traveled to Kabul in 1997 to negotiate with Taliban leaders. On 9/11, it became apparent that the Taliban had lied. Nevertheless, unveiling his new Afghanistan strategy at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009, former President Barack Obama declared, “We will support efforts by the Afghan Government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not only counseled re-engaging with the Taliban, but began talking to the exact same “moderate” Taliban officials who so disastrously lied to her husband’s team. From the perspective of Afghanistan’s stability and security, the results were just as bad: The Taliban interpreted negotiation as weakness to exploit and a sign of wavering U.S. commitment. Each administration can believe they have found moderate Taliban, but in reality they are simply becoming victims of a Taliban good cop-bad cop strategy. Mattis does not understand the ideology and narratives driving the Taliban, and his blind spot will get both Americans and Afghans killed.

There’s also the case of Iran. With increasing frequency, the Iranian people are rising up to challenge their leaders. There were uprisings in 1999, 2001, and 2009, but what began in December 2017 is different: Despite their best efforts, the Iranian government has not been able to stamp it out. Every few days in a different area of the country, ordinary Iranians take to the streets to protest the regime. Regime officials know this time is different. In recent months, they have taken tens of billions of dollars out of the country which they believe they too may soon have to flee. Against this backdrop, Mattis announced that the U.S. goal is not regime change or collapse in Iran. Let’s put aside the fact that the collapse of a regime like Iran’s would be a very good thing for not only for the United States, but for Iranians and the region. Even if Mattis did not believe it would be a net gain for the Middle East is the Islamic Republic no longer existed, why not simply remain silent? Essentially declaring his support for the continuation of a regime, and implying the rest of Washington agrees with him, only can deflate the momentum that ordinary Iranians have gained in their protests.

Then there’s Qatar. The Arab Quartet—Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have moved to isolate Qatar because of its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and a range of both Sunni and Shi’ite radical groups. Last year’s sudden diplomatic blow up did not come out of the blue; rather, it erupted after a similar case in 2014 which quieted only after Qatar promised to curtail finance for radical groups. Simply put, Qatar broke its word. For decades, both Democratic and Republican administration have urged America’s Arab allies to stand up to terrorism and to act in a proactive and coordinated fashion. That they finally did so should win them bipartisan support. But rather than congratulate them, Mattis chose to relieve pressure on Qatar and undercut their solidarity. True, Qatar hosts a U.S. airbase, but that was never meant to be a get-out-of-jail-free card on a range of Qatari terror sponsorship (nor is it essential given that Bahrain once hosted four times as many U.S. aircrafts). And it is also true that Saudi Arabia has had its own issues with terror finance. But the answer to that is not to let Qatar off the hook, but rather to extend the zero tolerance policy further.

At every point where radical Islamists or their sponsors challenge the United States, Mattis counsels dialogue and diplomacy. In conflicts with Islamists, he sees only grievances that diplomacy can resolve, but remains blind to the ideology which truly drives the Islamist challenge. In many ways, Mattis’ political and diplomatic instincts mirror those of Jimmy Carter. The difference between the two is that when Carter went down the rabbit hole in his quixotic quests to engage America’s enemies, he had his Defense Secretary Harold Brown to rein him in. Trump may wish to talk anytime, anywhere to dictators like North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, or Iran’s Hassan Rouhani (Trump doesn’t appear aware that it is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who actually calls the shots in Iran), but that’s why it’s even more important for men like Mattis to counsel Trump against his worst instincts. Alas, increasingly it appears Mattis shares them, and the results of his advice will be to throw life lines to failing regimes and benefit those who would most like to see the United States’s demise.

Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.

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