The “Five Eyes” intelligence partnership should be shrunk to four members, not grown to nine.
Rep. Ruben Gallego sees it differently. He wants to add South Korea, Japan, India, and Germany to the existing U.S.-led intelligence partnership with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand via the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.
So, what about the expansion idea?
True, both India and Japan are members of the China-focused “Quad” partnership. It might seem logical, then, to extend their access to Five Eyes. Gallego deserves credit for focusing on China, and his intentions are noble. The Democrat’s former service with the Marine Corps saw him deploy to Iraq between 2005 and 2006. His unit suffered one of the highest casualty rates since the Vietnam War. To be clear, he is a patriot.
Still, the congressman’s proposal is misguided.
Gallego explained his rationale in an Oct. 27 interview with Defense One’s Tara Copp. He suggested that the Five Eyes partnership was a 20th-century relic in need of 21st-century reform. Expanding the Five Eyes would serve as a “warning to China.” He added that some of those who might oppose him are “culturally unaware, and/or at some base level are subtly xenophobic about the idea of us sharing information with largely Asian non-Anglo countries.” Gallego says he’s “talked to many of our allies, and they’ve all advocated exactly for [a Five Eyes expansion].”
This is simplistic analysis. Allies want a seat at the titan table of U.S. intelligence-sharing? Gee, what a shock. Opponents of that inclusion are racist? Give me a break.
The issue, here, isn’t one of bolstering foreign relationships or rejecting racism. It’s the simpler point that adding Germany, India, Japan, and South Korea to the Five Eyes would not be helpful. It would threaten the means by which the Five Eyes, and the U.S. in particular, gather critical intelligence. It would help enable foreign governments to use this information against U.S. interests. And it would do so for no reciprocal gain.
Take Gallego’s inclusion of Germany.
While Germany is an erstwhile U.S. ally, its conduct toward China and Vladimir Putin’s Russia encapsulates its more complicated foreign policy. A similar problem applies to South Korea. Seoul is a U.S. ally, but its interests from the United States divorce on both North Korea (where Seoul seeks an appeasement-centered strategy) and China (where, like Berlin, Seoul prioritizes its trade relationship at the expense of human rights, territorial, and other concerns). South Korea’s National Intelligence Service also shares the French DGSE’s predilection of spying on U.S. economic targets. Giving Germany and South Korea access to cutting-edge U.S. cyberespionage tools is not a good idea.
Japan has the best case for Five Eyes membership. But where U.S. and Japanese interests intersect, as in relation to China’s military posture in the East and South China seas, the two powers already share intelligence as needed. Adding Japan would only add the risk of compromise.
That leaves India. While an increasingly important U.S. partner, one that shares major concerns over China, India’s intelligence apparatus remains beset by problems. Particular concern is often raised in terms of New Delhi’s operational security (keeping secrets) and often shoddy intelligence “tradecraft,” especially in cyberspace. India might one day make a critical Five Eyes ally. I hope so. But adding India now would give China and Russia access to U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian intelligence’s crown jewels.
Note that I leave New Zealand out of that list.
That cuts to the heart of why Gallego’s proposal is problematic. Because while New Zealand is a Five Eyes member, it cannot credibly be described as a true Five Eyes ally. Ultimately, the Five Eyes arrangement centers on two powers and one principle: Britain and the U.S., and trust. In particular, the alliance thrives thanks to the U.S. National Security Agency and Britain’s GCHQ sister service. Australia provides the alliance with a useful boosting effort in the Asia-Pacific and supports related military activity. Canada provides a capable but limited contribution (albeit one that will grow in utility with increasing Russian military activity in the Arctic).
New Zealand, however, offers more harm to the Five Eyes than it brings benefit.
Eviscerating Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s claims of moral leadership, her government has broken with the other Four Eyes and is openly beholden to China. Indeed, the penetration of Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Ministry of State Security espionage is so pronounced, its agents (yes, plural) have even served in New Zealand’s Parliament. To his credit, Gallego appears to recognize at least some of this problem. He rightly noted to Copp that Singapore offers greater naval access to the U.S. Navy than New Zealand.
Regardless, the lesson of New Zealand is not to expand the Five Eyes but to limit it. Where intelligence material can be shared with others to mutual benefit, it should be. But the sometimes separate, sometimes conjoined Sino-Russian challenge to the U.S.-led international order is immense. In that regard, expanding the Five Eyes would risk far more than it would gain.
Gallego should instead push for Four Eyes. Were he to do so, he would be deserving of bipartisan support.
