Was the 2003 invasion of Iraq a mistake?
On the available evidence 15 years later, yes. But Vox.com’s Dylan Matthews is fundamentally wrong to argue that George W. Bush lied about the intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program in the build-up to war.
Bush did not lie. Nor was the war a simple mistake that only an idiot could have fallen into at the time. Had Hussein remained in power, he would currently be involved in a nuclear arms race with Iran. He would almost certainly have reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction programs, and he may even have provided materiel to terrorist groups.
But let’s get to the deception question.
Matthews centers his two articles on David Corn’s articulation of six specific lies. Let’s take each of Corn’s lie claims in turn.
First, Corn and Matthews point to Bush’s October 2002 claim that Hussein retained a “massive stockpile” of biological weapons.
This wasn’t a lie. It was Bush’s justified interpretation of the available intelligence. In the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, “all [U.S. intelligence] agencies judged… that Iraq had biological weapons — that it had some lethal and incapacitating BW agents – and was capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax.” The NIE also assessed that Hussein had “the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year.” That justifies Bush’s choice of words. If he was wrong, it was not because he intended to deceive anyone.
Second, there’s Bush’s December 2002 claim that “we do not know whether or not [Iraq] has a nuclear weapon.”
Corn and Matthews say we did know that Hussein didn’t have a nuclear weapon. But this isn’t true. Yes, the available intelligence did suggest that Hussein lacked a nuclear weapon, but the intelligence assessments also suggested his continued interest, investment, and capability to produce such a weapon in a short time window. Context also matters in judging Bush’s words here. After all, Bush was repeatedly briefed on efforts by terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, to acquire nuclear weapons. In October 2001, Bush was told by the CIA that Al Qaeda might have a nuclear weapon in New York City.
Hussein’s threat here takes on relevance in the context of his verified links with Al Qaeda. More on that in a moment, because Corn and Matthews suggest Hussein’s links to Al Qaeda were fake news. But the key point here is that Bush’s post-9/11 nuclear security doctrine was justifiably based on the presumption of threat in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. One day, the history books will record the great risks Bush authorized on the part of the U.S. intelligence community to address nuclear-related threats. Were Bush’s words here poorly chosen? Probably. A lie? No. Also note that nuclear-related intelligence is rarely certain. North Korea’s nuclear program shocked the U.S. intelligence community in its speed and effect.
Third, then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s September 2002 assertion that aluminum tubes purchased by Saddam Hussein were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programs.”
Corn says this is fake news because the Department of Energy was advising the Bush administration to the contrary. But this is disingenuous. The 2002 NIE recorded that the nation’s three top foreign intelligence services; the CIA, NSA, and DIA “all believed the tubes were intended [for nuclear weapons activities.]” Moreover, “all agencies [including the DOE] agreed that the tubes could be used to build gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment program…”
Based on her consumption of the available intelligence and her role as Bush’s top national security adviser, Rice’s assertion was justified.
The fourth and fifth accusations center on Bush administration claims of Hussein’s links to Al Qaeda.
I would agree that the Bush administration exaggerated these links. But lie? No. Numerous Sunni-Islamist terrorists were granted safe haven by Hussein’s regime. And Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Salafi-Jihadist who later became the architect of Iraq’s sectarian bloodbath, retained an operational presence in Northern Iraq under Hussein. Was this coincidental? Well, a bipartisan 2008 Senate Intelligence committee’s report on pre-war intelligence found that:
This fits with broader research by Kyle Orton on Saddam’s Islamization campaign in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Corn and Matthews’ sixth assertion is that Vice President Dick Cheney was lying when he asserted in August 2002 that “there’s no doubt” Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.
Again, Cheney chose his words poorly, as Bush would do so in echoing him. But the abundant intelligence from U.S. and global foreign intelligence services suggested an overwhelming likelihood of Hussein’s continued possession of chemical and biological weapons, delivery systems, and an ability to surge production on short notice. The divergence in intelligence assessments was primarily rooted in whether Hussein would ever employ those weapons.
Ultimately, Matthews misrepresents the historical record to serve his own ideological impulses. The Iraq War may well have been a serious strategic error, and certainly the aftermath of the invasion was grotesquely mismanaged. But it is unfair to say that Bush “lied” about the intelligence material on Saddam’s presumed possession of weapons of mass destruction. That assertion requires a beyond reasonable doubt certainty that Matthews lacks the information to demonstrate.
