In any new conflict with Hamas, Israel will seize the initiative by employing heavy air strikes. Israel’s intent will be to force Hamas to agree to a cease fire on terms preferable to Israel.
All of this bears consideration in light of the dramatic rise in tensions that has occurred over the past 48 hours. It began on Sunday, when an Israeli special forces team was compromised as it conducted reconnaissance inside the Gaza Strip (likely targeting a Hamas meeting with leaders of the Popular Resistance Committees). In the ensuing firefight, seven Palestinians and one Israeli were killed. Tensions escalated on Monday when Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad seriously wounded one Israeli after firing about 200 rockets into Israel. In response, Israel launched air strikes against Hamas and PIJ command centers. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to authorize an escalation in Israeli air strikes overnight. Brewing for more than a year, a new conflict is now likely.
Still, Israel will aim to set the terms of any fight. While the most reliable and durable means of weakening Hamas and its allies would be an Israeli ground operation to clear the northern sectors of the Gaza Strip, Israel knows that any such operation would risk dozens of Israeli casualties. The challenge here is that once Israeli forces advance beyond the buffer zones that border Israeli territory (red circles in the map below), they will be caught in a maze of backstreets and looming towers. And that’s a problem because those urban spaces grant Hamas and its allies great tactical opportunity to launch devastating explosive and sniper ambushes.
Fortunately, however, Hamas does not want a drawn-out conflict. Thanks to its pathetic management of the economy and its inability to pay government workers, Hamas’ control in Gaza is weakening. In turn, while the group feels it must save face and burnish its Islamic-revolutionary credentials by striking Israel in some fashion, it wants to avoid a multi-week conflict that causes further degradation to Gaza infrastructure. The Israelis will thus assess that and a punitive campaign targeting Hamas/allied command and control, rocket, and logistical forces will be enough to move Hamas to an Egyptian-brokered compromise sooner rather than later. Hamas also knows that with the Egyptians now increasingly aligned with the de facto pro-Israel administration in Saudi Arabia, they will only suffer more if they anger Egypt.
Any Israeli campaign will likely be short but designed to achieve a durable outcome. Israel wants to put Hamas back in its box in a way that encourages Hamas to stay in that box for at least a year or so.
Keen to avoid Israeli casualties, Netanyahu will push the air force to lead any new campaign. While that choice will attract international condemnation alongside inevitable Palestinian civilian casualties, Netanyahu wants to avoid dead Israeli soldiers on the front page of Israeli newspapers. Nevertheless, the Israelis will also want to show Hamas’ leaders that they aren’t playing around. This interest isn’t simply about getting Hamas to the negotiating table quickly; it’s also a function of Netanyahu’s domestic political calculations. To show Hamas that it cannot use urban environments and human shields to avoid attacks, we’re likely to see limited ground incursions by Israeli armored units in order to scour Hamas facilities on the outer limits of northern Gaza settlements.
Ultimately, whatever the means of attack, a new conflict is almost certainly coming.
