Will President Joe Biden see America’s Middle Eastern allies moving closer to China and Russia?
It’s very likely.
The Trump administration has successfully kept U.S. allies moving away from Beijing in return for their access to greater U.S. support. Speaking to the Jerusalem Post, Assistant Secretary of State R. Clarke Cooper recently suggested that the sale of F-35 fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates would require its greater skepticism of China in return. “When the U.S. works with partners who are now seeking to be closer to Israel in civilian, defense, and security spaces,” Cooper said, “[it] will require those partners to take greater [caution] with technological security. With the greater joint efforts with the U.S., Israel, and signatories to the Abraham Accords, we want to make sure economic opportunities are just that and not additional risks.”
So, why, if the F-35 sale is already authorized, would Biden endanger this attempt to limit China’s influence?
It’s unlikely that Biden would actually rescind the F-35 sale, which also entails the sale of thousands of bombs and a few dozen combat drones. The UAE is no longer involved in the Saudi-led war effort in Yemen, which had been a point of significant concern on the Democratic Party’s left wing. In addition, Biden’s national security team will likely see this sale as relationship insulation against the UAE’s inevitable alarm over its effort to rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear accord.
Still, that Iran factor is front and center as to why I believe the UAE and the Saudis are going to move closer to Beijing after Jan. 20. These regimes see Iran through much the same prism as does Israel, which is to say as an existential enemy. Considering that the Biden administration seems set to prioritize a U.S. return to the Iran nuclear deal and apparently without first winning Tehran’s agreement of new safeguards for inspections and ballistic missile research, neither the UAE nor the Saudis are going to be happy with Washington. And they’re unlikely to give more than a polite ear to any requests from incoming Secretary of State Antony Blinken not to align more closely with Moscow and Beijing in response. That’s because those two governments will suddenly be seen as offering things that America alone cannot.
China will offer that which it has already begun laying the foundation for, which is to say an independent and weapons-capable nuclear program for Saudi Arabia and thus a Sunni-Arab nuclear umbrella in the region. If, as it will, Beijing requests U.S.-related technology transfers, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support in return for its nuclear provisions, the Saudis will ensure that the UAE and others acquiesce to at least some of these demands. In the same vein, while Israel had pledged to the Trump administration to reduce an unacceptable level of technology transfers to China, Biden is going to have a tougher time making that case if he’s simultaneously seen to be empowering Iran.
Then there’s Vladimir Putin’s angle.
In return for deprioritizing of U.S. interests and expanded investments in the Russian economy, Putin will provide the Sunni monarchies with his diplomatic leverage over Iran. Putin sees his military presence and dominance of Bashar Assad in Syria as a critical mechanism by which to leverage concessions from Israel, Iran, and the Sunni monarchies. After all, that presence gives Putin the means to allow or restrict Iranian arms flows, to bomb or not to bomb Sunni civilians, and to undermine perceptions of U.S. strategic credibility in the region. Perceptions of power and reliability matter as much as and help shape realities of power in the Middle East.
The simple point is this. If Biden returns to an unreformed Iran nuclear deal, long-standing U.S. allies will gravitate closer to our two top global strategic adversaries.
