History has not looked kindly upon countries that voluntarily surrender their nuclear capabilities.
In 1994, the newly independent Ukraine cheerfully agreed to destroy its massive nuclear arsenal that was inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2003, Moammar Gadhafi also surprised the world by agreeing to completely dismantle Libya’s nuclear weapons program. Today, Gaddafi is dead and Ukraine’s independence is slowly withering.
If the “supreme leader” of North Korea thought that his country was facing a difficult geopolitical predicament with nuclear weapons, then he is in for an unpleasant surprise should he take the very unlikely step of surrendering them.
While some experts are optimistic, others see Kim Jong Un’s shocking pledge to abandon the long-coveted program as a familiar North Korean strategy that has often been used to temporarily diffuse geopolitical tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But in order to fully understand whether Kim is committed to denuclearization, we must first analyze the key challenges North Korea will face without its nuclear arsenal.
1. Avoiding the risk of becoming weak and irrelevant.
The unforeseen detente between Washington and Pyongyang has now forced even the most devout skeptics of diplomacy to briefly ponder the ultimate question about Kim Jong Un — has the North Korean leader forgotten the dark fate of countries that have agreed to undergo complete denuclearization?
Even if Ukraine never actually possessed operational control of its weapons of mass destruction, what international community would watch with folded arms as Russia transforms the region into an unstable war zone that compromises the security of sophisticated nuclear warheads?
History, prudence, and rationality seem to suggest denuclearization is not the best path for a country that seeks global relevance and security. But if North Korea stays true to its (admittedly vague) promises, it’s most immediate challenge will be not to repeat the fate of other foolish leaders who have chosen to surrender the greatest strategic weapon yet that humanity has discovered.
2. Reinventing its foreign policy strategy.
As it stands today, North Korea serves as a small but powerful geopolitical magnet that distracts the United States from prioritizing other strategic objectives. As long as Kim has nukes, Washington will never fully commit to derailing Beijing’s territorial aspirations or tangibly oppose Moscow’s move to redraw the map of Europe. After all, when Pyongyang tests an ICBM that can reach the East Coast of North America, all other strategic concerns become temporarily irrelevant.
For North Korea, this unique ability to absorb the undivided attention of the world’s largest superpower has paid dividends. Year after year, the North Korean leadership has been able to find common ground with Russia and China, giving the regime enough support to maintain its stability.
Of course, a complete denuclearization would put a swift end to this unique strategic advantage, and force North Koreans to reinvent themselves in the sphere of global affairs. But given the country’s limited resources and production, Pyongyang will have to get very creative about how it chooses to pursue and redefine its foreign policy objectives.
3. Preventing domestic instability.
Another great challenge facing a post-nuclear North Korea is political instability. If Kim decides to change his tone toward the U.S. and improve the economic performance of his country, the iron curtain of the Hermit Kingdom will inevitably be penetrated by international trade and foreign corporations.
Likewise, North Korea’s desire to boost the productivity of its people will be directly tied to its willingness to tolerate domestic reform. If Kim wants to stay in power, he would be wise to review the Soviet Union’s fateful attempt to liberate its economy through perestroika, and the effects that such reform could have on a totalitarian state.
Will Pyongyang favor fast growth over its commitment to communism? Or will the country’s leadership remain loyal to an iron-fisted economy? How North Korea handles this precarious dilemma will undoubtedly decide the long-term future and stability of the Kim regime.
4. Resisting external pressure to reform its system of government.
Condemning North Korea for violating human rights while it actively prepares its weapons of mass destruction is much like condemning a terrorist mastermind for not paying his speeding ticket. After all, torturing political dissidents in a Soviet-style gulag never generates the same level of anxiety as a threat of a nuclear armageddon. It is precisely for this reason that the domestic atrocities committed by the North Korean regime have consistently failed to generate the same magnitude of outrage as its nuclear weapons program.
North Koreans have always taken full advantage of this reality, ensuring that any diplomatic negotiation with its geopolitical adversaries exclusively revolved around the question of nuclear weapons. Even after the most recent round of talks in Singapore, it became clear that the topic of human rights was not seriously discussed by either head of state.
A total deproliferation of its nuclear arsenal, however, will almost certainly make North Korea far more vulnerable to external campaigns seeking to reform its system of government.
Encouraged by a noble goal of ending the suffering of the North Korean people, the leaders of the free world will not wait long to demand that Pyongyang abandon its system of tyrannical oppression. In fact, some observers have already taken the opportunity to rightfully remind Americans that their president is making a deal with a mass murderer.
Just imagine how much louder this truth will resonate in a world where North Korea doesn’t possess a deadly nuclear deterrent to distract its foreign adversaries? Does Pyongyang really expect the frustrated critics of its government to forgive and forget its pathetic record on human rights as soon as the regime becomes defenseless? I don’t think so.
If North Korea was a small democratic country, the concept of trading nuclear arms for improved economic conditions would seem at least slightly plausible. North Korea, however, is far from that reality. And given the extraordinary obstacles that Kim will face after denuclearization, it becomes difficult to take his latest diplomatic pivot seriously.
Nikita Vladimirov (@nikvofficial) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is the founder of Inside Geopolitics and an editor for Campus Reform.
