Tuesday morning, we woke up to some unexpected headlines on North Korea. Following the South Korean delegation’s two-day trip to Pyongyang, Seoul announced that President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will be holding a summit at the end of April. Adding to this surprise package, Kim promised not to use nuclear or conventional weapons against the South, even expressing a willingness to “hold a heartfelt dialogue” with President Trump on denuclearization if Pyongyang’s security could be guaranteed. Kim also described denuclearization as a “teaching left by his ancestors.”
This comes at the heels of Pyongyang’s charm potion during the Pyeongchang Olympics, which cast a spell on the international audience, who, intoxicated by the spectacle and novelty of Pyongyang’s cheerleaders and Kim Yo-jong’s understated yet carefully calculated attendance at the opening ceremony, surrendered momentarily to a memory lapse of the DPRK’s wrongdoings.
Pyongyang’s ostensible 180-degree change and willingness to pursue dialogue raise our hopes of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and tighten the vise on Washington to soon decide how to deal with Kim. But this is not the first time the DPRK has expressed willingness to consider denuclearization. Consider the two previous inter-Korean summits, several rounds of unsuccessful Six-Party Talks, and other fora in which Pyongyang got so close to following through on its promises only to pull the rug beneath us.
Whichever route Washington and Seoul opt to pursue, the following three factors should undergird our deliberations and calculus vis-à-vis Pyongyang:
First, the personage of the North Korean leader – the three-generation “cult of personality” of the Kims – needs to be understood and applied at a deeper, more inherent level in Washington and Seoul’s decision-making. As is oft said, Kim is far more rational and complex than credited. A sophistiqué in the push-and-pull dance, he uses blustering and provocations to hold us in suspense, occasionally giving us relief by optimistic overtures to dialogue and rehabilitated behavior.
Valuable as the assessments on Kim’s personality and upbringing may be, how much of our calculus is based on a holistic, rooted understanding of the complexity surrounding Kim? Data points on Kim’s formative years and influences are all critical in composing a sketch of his persona. But what buttons of his can we push to turn the tables? How well do we really know Kim, to the extent that we can predict his moves several steps ahead and prepare contingency responses?
In strategy, we are to assume the enemy knows more than we think he does. Assume so for Kim, hold in reserve his weakest spots, and use these cards sparingly in the most apposite times to wear him down.
Second, as much as North Korea has evolved, fundamentals remain unchanged – the regime is still an isolationist, nuke-dependent entity. This returns us to the regime’s roots in juche (self-reliance). While its true self-reliance is debatable, what self-reliant state needs nuclear weapons to justify its legitimacy? And why would Kim put denuclearization as an option on the table now? Kim will not easily forgo this dynastic, monolithic identity, for doing so would be an admission of defeat and a relinquishing of Pyongyang’s deep-rooted, historic identity. We need to craft our strategy within the context of Pyongyang’s history and existential identity as a “self-reliant” nuclear state – note that this “self-reliance” is circumscribed within the viability of Pyongyang’s nuclear potential.
Finally, have we taken a pulse check on our credibility as perceived by Pyongyang? What message is the international community sending to Kim as we flip-flop between dialogue and a tougher posture? The absence of a consistent approach lends the perception that Washington, Seoul, and other interested parties are still pressed to decipher Kim, perpetuating the notion that collectively and individually, we have yet to come up with a coherent and longstanding North Korea policy. As such, a set of knee-jerk policy options would put us in an even tighter bind than we are currently facing – not to mention, erode our credibility and give Pyongyang even greater ammunition.
There’s no better time than now – amidst the white noise – to recalibrate our North Korea strategy. National interests may vary in shades, but if we have indeed identified Pyongyang as a common threat, then the parties should cast aside short-term, face-saving small wins and coalesce to form a coordinated, rooted, and consistent front against North Korea.
If we are intent on putting a definitive end to the North Korea problem, we would be remiss to overlook these fundamental factors as critical to a permanent, enduring solution on the Korean Peninsula.
Soo Kim is a former CIA North Korea analyst, focusing on the regime’s leadership, nuclear proliferation, and propaganda. She was a 2015 National Security Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where she authored a monograph on the South Korean nuclear program. She also specializes in illicit finance, homeland security, and US-Mexico relations.
If you would like to write an op-ed for the Washington Examiner, please read our guidelines on submissions here.
