Witnessing how the coronavirus has shredded our normal lives, North Korea is likely to get ideas.
Coronavirus has shown that even in the 21st century, a global pandemic can wreak havoc on economies, governments, and societies. In turn, Pyongyang will now view bioweapons as an impressive tool with which to blackmail others into concessions.
Kim Jong Un’s underlying strategic interest rests in ensuring long term regime survival in a condition of improved domestic economic comfort. That outcome requires a continued American reluctance to use force against North Korea, and a continued provision of economic aid from the international community. The coronavirus has shown him that he can achieve his objectives without relying on nuclear weapons as his sole tool of blackmail.
Bioweapons buy significant blackmail bang for the investment buck. In a way that nuclear cannot. While the current state of North Korea’s bioweapons program is subject to debate, we know that Pyongyang retains scientist and laboratory research and development competency, and stockpiles of weapon-deliverable agents. These stockpiles are likely to include smallpox, anthrax, and the black plague.
Adding to the concern here is the advancement of genetics research and associated opportunities for refining bioagents.
This scientific evolution enables scientists to manipulate the genetic coding of viruses and diseases in order to make them more contagious or lethal and more resistant to antivirals and antibiotics. Making matters worse, the North Korean regime’s massive concentration camp infrastructure and disdain for human rights means that it has ample opportunity to test new bioagents on human subjects.
Of course, it’s not enough for Kim to do the research and development. He has to translate that work into threats that earn new concessions from the international community. But how?
As with North Korea’s nuclear program, one means of Kim’s action will be to leave crumbs of evidence for the U.S. intelligence community to see what he’s up to. We already have a template here with Kim’s nuclear research. Kim knows that the United States knows he has been advancing his nuclear program, even as he has suspended long-range ballistic missile tests. Kim’s advancement of his warhead reentry vehicles and terminal stage targeting stand out here. But the key is that Kim is quite happy for the U.S. to know that he’s doing things he says he isn’t doing. It allows him to exert pressure on President Trump from behind the scenes while keeping up a friendly appearance on the international stage. The same principle would apply to Kim’s bioweapons program.
Bioweapons development arguably generates an even greater threat than nuclear weapons. That’s because the U.S. and South Korea must also be concerned that Kim’s bioagents might escape their laboratories and infect a local population. Considering Kim’s relative disinterest in the plight of his people, he cannot be trusted to take adequate precautions against this threat.
Kim will also have noticed how obsessed western populations have now, quite understandably, become with bioagents. He will venture that they will be increasingly predisposed to pressuring their political leaders to make deals for fear of suffering a new, but much worse, coronavirus.
Ultimately, this is another reminder of why we need a more robust deterrent posture on bioweapons. The U.S. must make clear that any bioweapons attack on our soil would risk a nuclear retaliation.
