The Trump administration says it is on the verge of a historic peace deal with the Taliban. The idea is simple: The Taliban will refrain from violence for a week, after which the United States will begin to withdraw its forces, and intra-Afghan dialogue can begin. While Trump is keen to declare victory and leave Afghanistan, regardless of the consequences, the elephant in the room remains Pakistan.
Afghanistan has long confounded U.S. policy, though the history of U.S.-Afghan relations is often misunderstood. It is a calumny to suggest the U.S. created, let alone supported, the Taliban. During the fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration supported the Afghan mujahideen, the precursor to the Northern Alliance and today’s Afghan government. The Taliban first emerged in 1994, meaning they were toddlers during the Soviet occupation. Say what you will about the CIA, but they do not arm kindergartners.
The basic problem during the fight against the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan occupation was Pakistan. Because Afghanistan is landlocked, all assistance for the mujahideen had to pass through Pakistan. When the Soviets invaded, Iran was still holding U.S. hostages, and the central Asian republics were still full-fledged members of the Soviet Union. The Pakistani intelligence services distributed any aid channeled through Pakistan but gave it exclusively to Islamist groups — the more radical, the better. The goal was not simply to defeat Soviet-inspired atheism but also nationalism of any sort. Pakistan had just lost half of its country with Bangladeshi secession, and, so, Pashtun nationalists based in Afghanistan were less an irritant than an existential threat.
After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistani authorities initially cast their lot with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun and a psychopath who made up for any lack of military success against the Soviets with tremendous cruelty to Afghanistan’s own people. Pakistani authorities switched their alliance to the Taliban, however, in recognition of the momentum of the Taliban’s rise.
In the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks and the subsequent start of U.S. military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan not only continued to arm and support the Taliban in order to undercut efforts to create a secure and stable Afghan government but also assisted al Qaeda, up to and including offering safe haven to al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.
U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and President Trump may believe a one-week ceasefire (occurring at a time when fighting in Afghanistan is minimal, anyway) will demonstrate enough Taliban sincerity to justify sending U.S. forces home, but they have shown no mechanism to test Pakistani sincerity. Unfortunately, all objective metrics suggest Pakistani leaders have not had a change of heart.
It has now been a year since a terrorist attack on the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway in Pulwama killed several dozen Indian police and security officers. The Indian government responded with a cross-border airstrike at Balakot. Diplomats rushed to address the flare-up between India and Pakistan, and Pakistani diplomats duly promised to restrain “militant” groups within its borders.
A year on, however, the insincerity of Pakistan’s actions is on full display. Consider the Financial Action Task Force: The Group of Seven founded the Financial Action Task Force in 1989 as an intergovernmental organization to combat money laundering. In 2001, its mission was expanded to include combating terror finance. Rather than take action against designated groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba operating within its territory, the Pakistani government seeks instead to use its diplomatic offices to get the United Nations to make exceptions for Lashkar-e-Taiba and its front groups.
When Pakistani authorities cracked down on Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamic State, al Qaeda, and Haqqani Network supporters, it treated them lightly. Even though terror financing convictions should bring between one and five years, Pakistani courts gave less than one year in 27% of cases. Nor have there been any significant prosecutions or convictions of group leaders. These are not the actions of a government that takes counterterrorism or regional security seriously. Rather, it is what governments do that want to continue to use terrorism as a tactic.
The Trump administration and those applauding an end to the U.S.’s longest war might want to turn a blind eye to problems in Khalilzad’s deal, but the Pakistan problem cannot be wished away, nor should the U.S. fall prey to diplomatic wishful thinking and absolve Pakistan of Financial Action Task Force blacklist penalties when it has not taken real action to resolve terror support within its own borders. There would have been no lasting Taliban insurgency without Islamabad’s support, and there will be no peace with Pakistani authorities believing they defeated America and that they can now act with impunity. What is at stake in Afghanistan is not only that country’s peace but security for the U.S., as well.
By ignoring the Pakistan problem, however, Khalilzad and Trump are ensuring neither Afghanistan nor the U.S. can find peace and security.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.
