In his first 16 months in office, President Trump has rescinded billions of dollars’ worth in Obama-era regulations, appointed a young Supreme Court justice and a raft of other conservative judges, and pressed a major tax reform bill through Congress.
That’s already enough to say that he’s put his mark on the nation for decades to come. But what may prove to be his most significant and exciting feat isn’t yet an accomplishment. That would be his impending June 12 meeting with North Korea’s unpredictable and murderous dictator, Kim Jong Un.
After years of especially belligerent North Korean behavior, including nuclear and missile tests designed to intimidate its neighbors, the sudden agreement by Kim to meet with South Korean President Moon Jae-in was a puzzling and unlikely outcome. So is his decision to meet with Trump, assuming it survives the current political jockeying.
Most outsiders wisely mistrust the Kim regime. President Bill Clinton’s agreement with Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, provided only a temporary illusion of an end to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Trump’s efforts could produce similar good feelings but prove similarly futile in the long run.
Still, the prospect of finally ending the Korean War after nearly seven decades, of defusing tension on the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps even of denuclearizing North Korea is extremely attractive.
In the run-up to this meeting, which we still believe will happen, Trump has been right to call Kim Jong Un’s bluff and keep denuclearization on the table as the goal. But he must also be quietly realistic and put his deal-making skills to work, because it is extremely unlikely that Kim Jong Un will ever give up his nukes.
The key is to remember always that the negotiations are about achieving certain sufficient ends, not necessarily a maximalist triumph. Trump is making a big ask, and that is the right way to proceed in public, but he should also be ready to negotiate and to consider his meeting a success if he gets enough rather than everything.
Kim Jong Un’s nuclear program pretty much guarantees his regime’s survival; that’s why he wants it. It is his personal insulation from ever being held accountable for his crimes against humanity. North Korea’s nukes are also a means of extracting continuing diplomatic and economic concessions from South Korea.
So, when the North complains as it did on Tuesday that it will not follow the Libyan model and disarm itself of nuclear weapons, it should be taken at its word. Moammar Gadhafi’s decision to end his nuclear program led to his death in a ditch a few years later. Kim Jong Un’s fate would almost certainly be the same.
So, it is highly unlikely that Kim Jong Un will give up his nukes. But is that be-all and end-all of the forthcoming talks? No, it need not be the case, even if denuclearization is an appropriate initial ask. What really matters, even if Kim Jong Un can keep his nukes, is that Trump makes him dismantle his nation’s intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Without those missiles, even a nuclear North Korea cannot pose a strategic threat to America.
Does that mean Trump would be betraying our South Korean ally? No. South Korea has lived next door to the North Korean bomb for the past decade. If the bomb cannot be delivered, it is a doomsday defensive weapon, not an offensive threat.
Although he must not say so now, Trump should have it in the back of his mind that it would be acceptable to live with a deal that led to a verified dismantling of Kim Jong Un’s ballistic missile program, alongside limits on his nuclear production and export activity. Such an outcome would come with meaningful security benefits, and it would also significantly reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the surrounding region. That is, after all, the real goal.
The U.S. can still get a good deal from Singapore. And, perhaps, just maybe, this will include total denuclearization. But that should not be expected. If Trump is realistic about what Kim Jong Un will give up and what U.S. security needs require, he will see that total denuclearization is not the only acceptable outcome.
This tactic, demanding 100 percent but being prepared to accept 80 percent, is not one that comes naturally to Trump, and therein lies a danger. He is thin-skinned and finds it difficult to accept any loss of face. But if he gets most of what he’s asking for — enough to make the Korean Peninsula, its neighbors, and the American homeland much safer — we hope he will not walk away in a rage.
