There is plenty of quality academic writing on how the relationship between the CIA and the United States’s special operations forces must evolve. Conventional wisdom has it that the CIA and SOF were so dedicated to counterterrorism operations since 9/11 that we collectively took our eyes off the ball in countering actions of state actors such as Russia and China, which we now term near-peer competitors.
I view this issue from the unique perspective of my old job as a CIA case officer in the field, where the rubber meets the road with a front-row seat to how we both collect intelligence and fight. I suggest that we look at the three Rs, relationships, resources, and Russia (and similar foes), as we assess the future CIA-SOF relationship.
Relationships. Let’s start with a fundamental fact: Ties between the CIA and SOF are at a historic high. When a CIA case officer sees a SOF operator pop up overseas, the first question is not “why are you here?” That marks a striking shift in attitudes. Prior to 9/11, distrust and some disdain were commonplace. I heard it all from both sides. Yet, the reaction when these two organizations now meet is far different. We are more apt to ask about each other’s spouses and children and make plans to meet up for drinks or dinner in between postings and deployments. Why is this? Why is there a familiarity and trust that now exists?
The answer, of course, is that we were in lockstep together for two decades from the cold mountains of eastern Afghanistan, the teeming alleyways of East Africa, and the heat of the Syrian Desert. We have risen through the ranks together from case officers and SOF operators to leadership positions in both outfits. This affords for extraordinary personal connections, the value of which cannot be underestimated. The trust I had in my SOF colleagues was written in the blood and sweat of the last 20 years. Does that mean that I necessarily agreed with what they were doing each and every time? Of course not. CIA and SOF are two distinct entities, and they often have substantive differences on a variety of subjects. What is important, however, is that the deconfliction mechanisms that exist are not only formalized but also are based on personal ties that can withstand the inevitable failed joint efforts, such as an unsuccessful strike against a terrorist target.
For example, as a case officer, my primary job was to handle an agent. Remember, an agent is not an American intelligence officer. He or she is a foreigner recruited to spy for the U.S. In war zones, I often would take a SOF operator with me to an agent meeting. The identity of an agent is sacrosanct to the CIA. It is the most cherished of the intelligence “crown jewels” that we protect. If exposed, agents could suffer terrible sanctions, including torture and death. Yet, we integrated SOF into agent operations for good reason. It provided SOF units with our faith in trusting them with exposure to our agent’s identity. In addition, SOF operators would have the ability to question the agent in person on how to hunt terrorist targets better. To me, this was a no-brainer. It became my norm when I ran operations in war zones.
This does not mean, however, that I ceded my agent-handling responsibilities to SOF. The CIA is the gold standard when it comes to espionage tradecraft. I wouldn’t ask a Navy SEAL to include me in a raid to take down a terrorist target. I know how to handle an agent. They know how to breach doors and dominate a location. But bringing the two sides together in an agent operation builds a huge amount of trust. So as we shift our focus to our near-peer competitors, these CIA-SOF personal relationships offer huge benefits. We must use them to maximum effect.
Resources. As a case officer or manager in a CIA station, the first question we ask after receiving a collection requirement is “do we have the money and materiel to accomplish this task?” Here, I see great promise when the CIA and SOF maximize productivity and effort by working together.
Consider a hypothetical scenario. A CIA station in one of our embassies abroad is under pressure from Washington as the Chinese are using funds to buy influence among the business and political elite of a certain country. The station learns that a SOF element is arriving to train the local security services. The first question the station will ask the element is a variation on “what level of tradecraft training do you have?” Put simply, do the arriving operators have the requisite street skills, such as surveillance detection training? Do they know how to detect and defeat surveillance teams and technical efforts?
Remember, a station has many tasks to accomplish and is, in essence, undermanned 24/7. But with a positive response from the SOF team, the station will be jazzed with the arrival of what the military calls “force multipliers.” In my experience as a case officer and station manager, if a SOF member had tradecraft training, I would hope that they would not be watching the American Forces Network at night. Instead, I hope they would hit the streets with us, providing value and adding to our collective mission. Resources really mean maximizing our on-the-ground talent.
The last R: Russia. This signifies the shift in target set away from counterterrorism to near-peer competitors. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy calls for just this shift, and the CIA is doing the same. But the third “R” is not just Russia. It also encompasses China, Iran, and North Korea.
Since 2001, the CIA and SOF have become highly adept at what we call “manhunting.” The Find-Fix-Finish paradigm revolutionized the counterterrorism fight: We find a target’s location, we fix that they will be in this location for a period of time (and scrutinize their defensive and escape options), and then we capture or kill them. The death of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Gen. Qassem Soleimani was a perfect example of how good the U.S. has become in tracking adversaries. But when it comes to nation-state targets, let me be very clear: I am only calling for the “Find-Fix” portion of an operation and am not advocating “Finish” options.
Still, if we are so worried about Chinese espionage activities globally, shouldn’t we more actively follow Chinese Ministry of State Security and People’s Liberation Army intelligence officers? Shouldn’t we determine whom they are meeting with and why and how they are doing so? Are these officers calling on certain companies? Are they trying to recruit host-country targets?
We want to establish so-called “pattern of life” assessments on these adversaries. The CIA and SOF can work this surveillance problem set together, just as they did against al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
True, there are challenges to overcome. This shift may take a change in mindset for SOF because there is no kinetic finish component to such operations. Truth be told, the “three F” fight had become a drug for many of us in both outfits. We relished the finality of the finish portion, as the target was neutralized and one less terrorist was alive to threaten our fellow citizens. The near-peer world is not like this at all, and SOF will need to adapt. For example, manhunting on near-peer entities is just one part of an operation. Compartmentalization, or person-to-person limitation of access to intelligence, will necessitate that SOF units may never know the fruits of their labor. If SOF obtained a pattern of life profile for a Chinese intelligence officer and then passed this targeting package to the CIA for a potential recruitment approach, it is likely that SOF will never know the results. There are no Zero Dark Thirty movies made after conducting a month of surveillance on a hostile intelligence officer.
I’m confident these three Rs can be the foundations of the future CIA-SOF relationship. We proved to be outstanding partners in the two decades following 9/11, and there is no reason why this relationship should not flourish in the post-2021 environment.
Marc Polymeropoulos is a former CIA senior operations officer. He retired in 2019 after a 26-year career serving in the Near East and South Asia. His book Clarity in Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the CIA will be published in June 2021 by HarperCollins.
