The pageantry, pomp, and circumstance was a sight to behold as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un strolled south of the Demilitarized Zone, hand-in-hand with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, becoming the first member of the Kim dynasty to step foot on South Korean soil since the 1950-1953 Korean War. The entire ceremony was impeccably choreographed, even down to the food, and meant to showcase to the world that new beginnings of a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula were on the horizon. Moon and Kim looked like long-lost brothers, laughing, joking, hugging, and making grand pledges of denuclearization, normal economic relations, and diplomatic normalization. As Kim wrote in the guestbook as he entered the Peace House straddling the border, “New history starts from here. At the start of history, and an era of peace.”
Is this truly the beginning of an historic diplomatic peace between the two Koreas, a permanent calm that has eluded the peninsula for seven decades? The leadership in Pyongyang and Seoul are certainly giving peace a chance; Kim and Moon promised to start a formal process of officially ending the Korean War by signing a peace treaty this year. North Korea’s willingness to allow the phrase “complete denuclearization” in the joint declaration was a significant inclusion, if for no other reason in that it reaffirms the central goal of the upcoming meetings between Kim and President Trump in several weeks’ time.
As with everything involving North Korea, the major promises made after the summit need to be taken with a few grains of salt. The warm and fuzzy feelings between Kim and Moon are far better for the stability of the Korean Peninsula than the mutual scorn of last year, when Pyongyang was testing intercontinental ballistic missiles and Seoul was holding late-night emergency national security council meetings.
But right now, all we have are commitments. To state the obvious, the North Koreans have signed onto these statements before and have reneged or scurried away from implementation when it was in their interest to do so. The Panmunjom Declaration is not so much a binding document as it is a communique or press release capturing the beaming intentions of the moment. Will this moment last, or will it die a quick death as soon as the North and South attempt to work out the details?
For the Trump administration, the inter-Korean summit is good news. Trump is clearly happy that the meetings went well, because if it didn’t, his own meeting with the North Korean leader may have been postponed or canceled altogether. Yet the White House would be making a critical error in judgment if they traveled to their discussions with the North Koreans with the belief that Pyongyang will be as eager to make peace with the Americans as they are with their fellow Koreans.
Kim be all smiles now, but it is incredibly unlikely that he and his team would be open to the scheme the Trump administration is contemplating – immediate and verified dismantlement of the North’s nuclear weapons program before a single penny of sanctions relief is wired to the regime’s bank accounts. The North Koreans, who have no trust of the Americans whatsoever and who are constantly concerned about Washington reneging on its own commitments, will insist on a cumbersome but perhaps inevitable step-by-step process during any denuclearization talks with the United States. And Kim will have the support of the Chinese, Russians, and perhaps South Koreans for that type of arrangement. Will the White House agree to play ball, or will it continue to insist on major concessions upfront?
While the Koreas are celebrating, it would be best if the Americans held their champagne. The button line has not moved an inch: Kim will do everything possible to maintain a nuclear deterrent that has not only provided his regime with a safety net, but has dragged a U.S. president into the same room as a North Korean leader for the first time in history.
The world has high expectations for the summit, and the joint North-South declaration will play into those expectations. The administration, however, needs to do the exact opposite: keep their expectations low while planning for a long-term deterrence strategy if the Kim regime resists parting ways with its nuclear missiles.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a fellow at Defense Priorities.
