Here’s a negotiating question: if you have a lot of leverage, why give everything away before you even get to the table?
I ask that question because of North Korea’s apparent willingness to surrender anything and everything without reciprocity from the U.S. On Thursday, South Korea’s president Moon Jae-in declared North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has now waived his previous demand he would denuclearize only if the U.S. were to withdraw its military forces from South Korea.
This latest giveaway extends from another Kim offer to denuclearize per se, as well as suspend his intercontinental ballistic missile program.
What does Kim want in return?
According to Moon, just a peace treaty to end the Korean War and a U.S. commitment not to overthrow his dynasty.
I’m not buying it. Don’t get me wrong, if all this is for real then I say full speed ahead for President Trump. The successful denuclearization and ballistic missile disarmament of North Korea is well worth a peace treaty. But I’m profoundly skeptical the leader who just six months ago was entertaining imminent U.S. military decapitation strikes against his regime and rubbing salt into Trump’s wounded ego has now transformed into a happy dove.
While the Trump administration claims its “maximum pressure strategy” is what brought Kim to the table, I think Kim’s pretense of doveishness is rooted in two other considerations.
Namely, Chinese influence on Pyongyang and Kim’s already advanced ICBM capability.
On the first point, China wants to avoid U.S. military strikes on North Korea while earning Trump’s grateful perception Beijing is helping to solve the crisis. This is Xi’s masterstroke: deferring tougher U.S. action on tariffs, intellectual property sanctions, and contesting of China’s South China Sea militarization, simply by getting Kim to the table.
And from Kim’s perspective why not get to the table?
After all, the last remaining element of the fat boy’s ICBM development is likely his perfection of a re-entry survivable warhead vehicle and terminal stage targeting. And once he gets that work done — the vast majority of which can be done in the lab — it’s Kim Jong Un’s game. He’ll have a nuclear deterrent/strike program.
At that point, Kim’s in a far better position to negotiate with the U.S. because any U.S. military option would come with the corollary, credible risk of North Korean nuclear retaliation. The simple point: Kim is camouflaging himself as a dove to approach his unsuspecting target.
So what should Trump do?
Well, stop wasting time and sit down with Kim as soon as possible so the North Korean leader has less time to finish his ICBM development. At that meeting, Trump should test Kim at his word with a request for wide ranging snap inspections.
And if, as it probably will, that option fails, Trump should dramatically ramp up sanctions on Chinese financial outlets — large and small — that do business with Kim, inspect all vessels transporting materials to Kim in breach of sanctions, and prepare for military strikes. Trump should also explicitly warn Kim that any attempt to launch a nuclear-armed ballistic missile against U.S. territory will result in nuclear strikes.
A realistic diplomatic agreement will only be possible when we’re skeptical of Kim bearing gifts.
