The two-and-a-half weeks since Israel struck the T-4 air base in Syria, killing seven members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have evoked analogies to the Hamtana (“Waiting”) period of May 1967 before the Six Day War. This felt like the most dangerous period in Israel’s history. President Lyndon Johnson threatened to abandon Israel if it struck the Arab coalition first. Confidence in the decision-making of then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol dropped, forcing him to give up the defense portfolio to Moshe Dayan. To underscore the national zeitgeist of dread, even the pariah Menachem Begin, leader of the right-wing Herut, was invited to join the national unity government. Israel’s agile, fortuitous victories over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria has allowed history to gloss over the anxiety that preceded the six days of achievements on the battlefield.
After the T-4 strike, Israeli decision-makers and the public alike find themselves in another Hamtana-like period of anxiety, waiting for Iranian retaliation. However, difficulties in projecting force across territory, Hezbollah’s preoccupation with the Lebanese elections, and Iran’s domestic constraints raise the costs of a significant retaliation against Israel.
At first glance, the numbers alone should give Israel cause for anxiety.
Iran has a slight edge over Israel in nominal GDP in U.S. dollars ($368.5 billion versus $340 billion), while Israel dwarves Tehran as a haven for foreign investment ($95.7 billion vs. $4.7 billion). However, using figures provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military Balance (2017), the military balance of power between the two is relatively equal.
Each side spent $15.9 billion on defense in 2016. Iran has 130,000 personnel, 220,000 conscripts, and an additional 350,000 reservists, while Israel has 133,000 active personnel and another 400,000 reservists. Iran has 18,000 Naval personnel (2,600 naval aviation), while Israel has 9,500 active and 10,000 reservists. Iran has 30,000 in its Air Force (including 12,000 air defense) and 2,600 in the Marine Corps; Israel has 34,000 active personnel and another 55,000 in reserve. It is estimated that the IRGC has 100,000 ground forces, 20,000 naval forces (including 5,000 marines), between 40,000-60,000 paramilitary forces for law enforcement, with an additional 450,000 available upon mobilization, and an estimated 1 million Basijis available upon mobilization. Israel does not have a parallel organization to the IRGC.
A significant part of Iran’s problem is its inability to project military force (known as the loss-of-strength gradient). This is why it relies on proxies such as Hezbollah — and why it is busy establishing bases in Syria. (In November, Israel attempted to reach an agreement with the U.S., Russia, and Jordan that Shia militias be moved 60 km from the border in the Golan Heights. Israel received a promise that pro-Iranian rebels would be kept between 5-20 km from that border, but that commitment has not been kept).
A second factor concerns Hezbollah’s own interests in Lebanon. The Shia militia-cum-state-within-a-state may want to avoid being dragged into an Israeli-Iranian conflict lest it be seen as a proxy of a foreign power during the first elections since 2009. Second, it has been hypothesized that Hezbollah could use a conflict between Israel and Iran as an opportunity to takeover the Lebanese state itself. This further limits Iran’s ability to retaliate against Israel.
A third factor concerns the domestic, political, and economic stability of Iran itself. Iranian society is facing drastic income inequality issues and a potential banking crisis due to toxic assets. In addition to a currency that continues to depreciate, Iran continues to face a long-term, man-made water shortage. The latter has led Iran to engage in water smuggling in Afghanistan. While some international relations theorists would argue that domestic troubles would augur for conflict, others, such as M. Taylor Fravel at MIT argue that domestic instability provides states with potent incentives to pursue peace. Rather than seeking a scapegoat, embattled leaders may seek compromise (or, in the case of Iran, delay retaliation) in order to conserve resources in order to confront threats to regime security.
As Israel goes through a second Hamtana, it is important for both its own decision-makers as well as concerned powers in the region to be mindful of constraints on Iran’s room for maneuver. First, there are significant limits on the Islamic Republic’s ability to project military force beyond its own borders. Second, Hezbollah, its chief proxy, is currently more interested in pursuing its designs in Lebanon than being dragged into a war between Tehran and Jerusalem. Third, domestic political compulsions within Iran make the use of force a potentially explosive — even revolutionary — choice for the incumbent regime.
Albert B. Wolf (@albertwolf82) is an assistant professor of political science at the American University of Afghanistan.
