Two developments concerning relations between the United States and Taiwan took place within the last month, and it is testimony to the absurdness that is 2020 that they have gone largely unnoticed.
The first was the declassification of two cables sent in 1982 delineating America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security: one from U.S. Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and the second from Secretary of State George Schultz, both to James Lilley, director of the American Institute in Taiwan (the closest thing America has to an embassy in Taipei since Jimmy Carter told all of Taiwan’s diplomats to go home in 1979).
Eagleburger’s cable outlined the official U.S. position regarding arms sales to Taiwan and instructed Lilley to convey it to Taiwanese President Chiang Ching-kuo. Essentially, that position was that the U.S. would not agree to terminating arms sales to Taiwan by any certain date, as the People’s Republic of China demanded, but that it would be willing to reduce those sales over time, on the condition of the People’s Republic of China committing to seek a peaceful resolution to the Chinese-Taiwanese issue. This condition was explicitly reiterated in the cable.
The second one, from Schultz, offered six assurances from President Ronald Reagan to Taiwan. Those were that the U.S. 1) had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 2) had not agreed to consult with the People’s Republic of China on arms sales to Taiwan; 3) would not play a mediation role between the two countries; 4) had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5) had not altered its position concerning Taiwanese sovereignty, and; 6) would not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the People’s Republic of China.
The declassification of the cables themselves is not especially revealing — those assurances have been pretty much public from the time they were offered and have more or less guided our strategic relationship with Taiwan ever since. But they do provide a bit of interesting historical insight and perspective on the contemporary scene. They reiterate that America’s stance on the region, including any limitations or reductions in arms sales, was, and is, entirely conditional on reciprocal assurances of Beijing’s peaceful intentions across the strait. Those intentions have become menacingly less convincing in recent months, as the People’s Republic of China has stepped up its military activity in the area, including an incursion of some 30 warplanes into Taiwanese airspace three weeks ago.
Under that shadow, the symbolism associated with the declassification of the defense cables becomes a little starker.
The other major development was in the economic arena. In late August, Taiwan agreed to lift its ban on imports of U.S. beef and pork, as reported in the Washington Examiner. This was a fairly charitable move by Taipei; agricultural trade has long been a critical issue for the nation, as it seeks to protect its agricultural base of smaller-scale farmers. The significance of this as a generous opening move by Taipei in pursuing a potential bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. ought not to be overlooked.
Such a trade deal would be in both countries’ best interests; but for Taiwan especially, it would offer fortification against economic bullying by the People’s Republic of China, which routinely blocks Taiwanese inclusion in regional trade deals. Currently, nearly 50% of Taiwan’s exports are to the Communist Chinese mainland and Hong Kong (now essentially the same thing). That sort of financial domination leaves Taiwan at the tender economic mercy of the People’s Republic of China, which still considers Taiwan a rogue province and not a sovereign nation.
China has been insidiously spreading its tentacles wherever they may reach over the past several years. Beijing has, rather surreptitiously, increased its investment footprint in Europe while steadily expanding its influence within the United Nations, bending the institution to its will and allowing China to deflect international scrutiny of the misery it continues to inflict within its borders and wishes to export to Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China has been conducting a diplomatic war of attrition against Taiwan, declaring that any relations, official or informal, with Taipei will not be tolerated. Taiwan, at one point, was recognized by 23 countries; the People’s Republic of China has whittled that away to 15.
America has a strategic, not to mention moral, obligation to Taiwan, a redoubt of democracy, human rights, and freedom of enterprise up against the hulking enormity that is Red China, and Taiwan could well be the storm center of the next major crisis in Asia. Yet hardly a word has been mentioned during the volatile presidential campaign of what the future of U.S.-Taiwanese relations would look like under either administration.
Given China’s increasing assertiveness, in the region and beyond, it is reasonable, necessary even, for whomever the next president of the U.S. is to explore the question publicly: To what extent ought America formalize our commitment, military and economic, to Taiwan?
Kelly Sloan (@KVSloan25) is a Denver-based public affairs consultant and columnist.
