What now for US policy toward North Korea?

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ended his moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests. North Korea, he says, will soon exhibit a new weapon for the world.

Some will now call for an immediate escalation against Kim. Indeed, some already have. Take President Trump’s former national security adviser, John Bolton. In a recent interview with Axios, Bolton questioned whether Trump is committed to preventing North Korea from reaching a long-range, nuclear-armed missile capability. Bolton said that if Trump was committed, he “would be pursuing a different course” involving the interception of North Korean smuggling operations off its coast.

But is that the right course of action? Not yet.

The first problem is that North Korea’s commensurate escalation would almost certainly follow from a naval blockade of the kind Bolton suggests. Yes, Kim has suspended his moratorium. Still, he hasn’t yet launched new intercontinental ballistic missile tests. Yes, it’s true that Kim is likely to recommence ICBM tests in the near future. But if the U.S. Navy were to start searching North Korean vessels now, diplomatic off-ramps would likely disappear at least until 2021.

The second concern here is Kim’s strategic mindset.

As I understand it, Kim remains unconvinced as to whether he should be the great North Korean reformist a la Mikhail Gorbachev or the loyal servant to the Kim dynasty’s old extortion racket: nuclear blackmail for aid and sanctions relief. There remain indications, such as his careful personal diplomacy with Trump, that Kim may choose the reformist route. But until then, Kim will remain vulnerable to the whispers of his hawkish inner circle — hard-liners such as Kim Yong Chol.

Creating space for diplomacy and trust-building with Kim is thus a worthy endeavor as far as it’s compatible with U.S. security. It is also worth noting here that Bolton’s target for successful diplomacy, North Korea ending its nuclear program, has always been entirely unrealistic. Kim will never surrender that which he believes ensures his dynasty’s survival on the international stage and its credibility at home. That said, Kim might agree to suspend his nuclear weapons program and move his existing stockpile to an internationally monitored site on his soil. If he’s willing to do that and to suspend his ICBM program, diplomacy can succeed.

So what to do if Kim does launch a new ICBM test?

At that point, an increase in sanctions and further limitations on North Korea’s global diplomatic and organized crime fronts would be appropriate. That approach would increase pressure while retaining an outlet for a return to diplomacy. In contrast, if America is seen to rush toward escalation, our ability to unify the world (China and Russia excluded) in support of our diplomacy will suffer. And if war ever comes, we will need those allies.

So yes, Bolton is right that the present diplomatic course is suffering. But he is wrong in his suggested remedy. We must proceed realistically but cautiously. Kim may yet become willing to participate in the art of the deal. And we should do everything in our power to get that deal. After all, whatever it might end up being, the alternative would be very far from artful.

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