Blaming Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Monday for its disinterest in continuing talks, North Korea sought preemptive justification for a new intermediate-range or long-range ballistic missile test. That test should be expected soon.
North Korea is hoping that it can attract President Trump to blame Pompeo for driving relations downwards, and in so encourage Trump to fault Pompeo rather than Kim Jong Un for the state of diplomacy.
But even by its soaring standards, North Korea isn’t holding back its rhetoric here.
Responding to Pompeo’s mild comments calling for Pyongyang’s return to the negotiating table, the foreign ministry suggested that this, “makes us misjudge who is the real chief executive in the U.S. Hearing Pompeo’s reckless remarks, we dropped the interest in dialogue with further conviction, but have become more zealous for our important planned projects aimed to repay the U.S. with actual horror and unrest for the sufferings it has inflicted upon our people.”
See the appeal to Trump’s ego: “Who is the real chief executive?” Now note that the same statement lamented how Kim and Trump’s “excellent” and “firm” relationship hasn’t lead to an improvement in relations. That striking division in descriptions of Trump, Pompeo, and U.S. policy is the key here. North Korea is trying to use Trump’s personal regard for his relationship with Kim in order to shield itself from prospective pushback if and when it decides to escalate.
A keen student of the Trump administration’s internal dynamics, Kim’s inner circle knows that Trump puts much more faith in his diplomatic outreach to Kim than does Pompeo. Kim also knows that Trump is less interested in the North Korean extortion game than is Pompeo and the rest of the U.S. national security establishment.
In turn, led by hard-liner consigliere, Kim Yong Chol, Kim’s U.S. policy is increasingly designed to placate Trump with kind words towards him personally, while simultaneously upping the pressure for U.S. concessions. The need for these concessions is informed by North Korea’s economic situation. The economy remains incredibly weak and is becoming further strained by the coronavirus pandemic. In that context, and in consideration that recent short-range ballistic missile tests have failed to earn U.S. concessions, North Korea is likely to conduct a near term intermediate-range or long-range ballistic missile test. Kim will hope that doing so will grab Trump’s attention and earn his new gifts.
But that’s only one side of the calculation here.
Because the moment it fires off a longer-range missile, Kim’s regime will reemphasize its narrative that Pompeo, not Kim, is to blame for the escalation, while showering Trump with new praise for his friendship with Kim. Based on North Korean tradition, the regime might even offer a limited U.S. nuclear inspections visit to certain largely irrelevant sites. Something it believes Trump will view as a big win even if it’s unimportant.
Again, however, the underlying objective here will be to cultivate Trump’s understanding that real diplomatic progress is possible, but only if he sidelines Pompeo as an excessively hawkish obstacle to that progress.
