The brewing confrontation between Russia and Belarus is coming to a head. For the past few months, the Minsk government has resisted Moscow’s pressure to establish a closer union and to even amalgamate the two states.
The presidential elections in Belarus on Aug. 9 will not only indicate the extent of opposition to President Alexander Lukashenka, but they will also test Russia’s response to a country that is veering away from its imperial orbit. Belarus is Russia’s largest ally in Europe. Since his election in 1994, Lukashenka has been engaged in a precarious balancing act to retain Belarusian sovereignty while benefiting from economic links with Moscow.
As Russia’s economy has taken a nosedive over the last year, Lukashenka can no longer count on cheap energy to prop up the budget in the midst of a pandemic induced recession. He has sought closer relations with the European Union and the United States and calculated that Western support could help shield him from Kremlin pressures to transform the hollow Russia-Belarus Union into an enlarged Russian state.
Yet a new element has appeared on the scene and unsettled both Minsk and Moscow. There is a real prospect that a hotly contested election could challenge the authoritarian status quo that has restricted Belarus’s progress into Western institutions. Large pre-election demonstrations in support of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s bid for the presidency indicate that Lukashenka finally confronts a credible challenger to his rule. The authorities have been hesitant to conduct mass repressions lest this provokes even greater unrest. A Lukashenka victory amid charges of ballot-rigging could spark a more extensive revolt reminiscent of the “colored revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia.
Vladimir Putin fears instability and political change in Belarus and has three main options to keep the country estranged from the West. First, he may try to preserve Lukashenka’s rule and even offer to help subdue public protests in return for a clearer Russia-oriented foreign policy. He may also try to replace him with a more compliant figure in the midst of post-election mayhem and even claim that the successor is a more democratic figure who will prevent chaos.
The third option would be a more direct Russian intervention to forestall the installation of a pro-Western government. Numerous pretexts could be used by Moscow, as they were in Ukraine before the 2014 invasion, including claims that the democratic opposition are fascists, that the new government wants to turn Russians into second-class citizens, or that incoming officials are American proxies paid to transform Belarus into a forward base for NATO operations against Russia.
Putin fears independence and democracy in neighboring states as a threat both to his imperial goals and his hold on power. Belarus is not a democratic state, but if it remains independent, it has a chance to develop into one and serve as an example for Russia itself. Under Kremlin control, that chance will be extinguished.
The Kremlin will calculate that the Western reaction to a Russian-supported crackdown or regime change in Belarus would be tolerable. A few statements about the “unacceptability” of Moscow’s moves together with nominal sanctions may be the only repercussions at a time when Europe and the U.S. are embroiled in domestic crises. Despite persistent Russian attacks on Western democracies and independent states like Belarus, the U.S. and EU approach has been defensive and ineffective. Any offers of detente work to the Kremlin’s advantage, as Western compromises simply nourish the pursuit of more targets. The only policies that have proven successful in reversing Moscow’s offensives, as evident in the Soviet era, is to focus on Russia’s internal weaknesses and support the demands of its citizens, nations, and regions.
To be taken seriously, Washington needs a clearer signal for Putin not to interfere in Belarus’s politics. If the transatlantic alliance openly backs the democratization of Belarus, surely the same principle should apply to Russia. A more effective strategy to oppose Moscow’s aggression would be to encourage political pluralism, regional devolution, and republican autonomy in Russia itself. The wave of anti-Kremlin protests in Khabarovsk and other cities indicates that as in Belarus, the population is finally awakening.
Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. His recent book, co-authored with Margarita Assenova, is entitled Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks.
