Meeting Kim Jong Un in Beijing this week, Xi Jinping was focused on China’s long-term interests. To that end, the Chinese president would have sought two core commitments from the North Korean leader.
First, Kim’s undertaking not to sign any agreement without first consulting and receiving the assent of Beijing to that deal’s content.
Second, Kim’s tying of Chinese strategic interests into the envelope of any medium-term deal with the U.S.
These two factors bear close consideration in that some observers seem to think Kim’s high society Beijing visit (he got a state banquet and an honor guard) is evidence of Xi’s pursuit of warmer relations with Kim. That analysis is incorrect.
In fact, this trip was a very Chinese way of reminding Kim that North Korean leaders must bow to Beijing. The meeting was on Chinese soil, and the events were carefully choreographed in Chinese form. That said, the Beijing bonanza does repudiate a carefully cultivated narrative China has presented to the U.S.: Namely, that Beijing has limited influence with which to influence its regime.
As Kim’s submissive visit and the reality of Beijing’s financial and export support proves, that Chinese narrative is false. Regardless, the most important consideration here is what China wants from Kim. The North Koreans will almost certainly play nice with the U.S. in the short-term aftermath of any Trump-Kim summit. They’ll suspend new missile and nuclear tests and will even cease most operations at nuclear facilities.
Yet, Kim is highly unlikely to allow the kind of vigorous inspections and program dismantling that would truly test his seriousness about a nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) compromise.
Of course, China knows this and doesn’t care. Xi simply wants to drag out the negotiating process as long as possible so that both he and Kim get their own victories and America is left in limbo.
What would these victories look like? Well, in Kim’s case, the victory would be international sanctions relief, the avoidance of U.S. military action, and the continuing covert development of ICBM strike forces towards a high-confidence redundant capability. In Xi’s case, the victory would be twofold. First, the avoidance of U.S. military strikes on the North that might end Kim Jong Un’s regime and lead to a pro-western government on China’s border.
Second, a reduced U.S. military footprint in South Korea (including removal of the THAAD air defense system China despises) and the broader region. The best summit signal here is the language with which Kim concluded his visit.
The North Korean leader offered to peacefully denuclearize if the U.S. engages in “progressive and synchronous measures for the realization of peace” (code words for canceling training exercises and reducing the U.S. military force presence in the region).
But for Xi, it’s the region, stupid. He knows that even if the U.S. removes its airborne nuclear forces (B-2 bombers, etc.) from the region, it will always keep a powerful military presence in South Korea and retain nuclear strike forces under the waves.
The priority for Xi is that any rolling agreement between the U.S. and North Korea leads the U.S. to cease its challenge of China’s imperial island campaign in the South China Sea. If Xi gets the U.S. to end its defense of free transit through the Pacific commons, he can consolidate his project of regional economic-political hegemony. And that will be a major step towards his ultimate ambition of displacing the U.S. international order.
This is the Xi masterstroke: loop the Korean crisis into the service of Chinese grand strategy.
In the longer term, both Kim and Xi hope to draw out negotiations until South Korea becomes fundamentally separated from the U.S. policy stance that a North Korean ICBM capability is totally unacceptable. China has already made significant progress here. One or two years more should push Seoul into near absolute appeasement on ICBM-related issues.
So, what should the U.S. do in response to all this?
First, drop the talking points.
White House press secretary Sarah Sanders’ comment on Tuesday that White House officials “see [the Beijing talks] as further evidence that our campaign of maximum pressure is creating the appropriate environment for dialogue with North Korea” was delusional. It plays to the Xi-Kim agenda.
Instead, Trump should focus on the exigency of time and meet with Kim as soon as possible (next week, if feasible). Next, the president should push for IAEA snap inspections to commence the week after he first meets Kim. That will test Kim’s seriousness and challenge the Chinese and North Koreans at their own game.
And if, as is very likely, the North Koreans then refuse or obstruct IAEA snap inspections, Trump should sanction Chinese financial entities of every type and size. At that point, Xi can go back to the drawing board with a little more humility.
