Americans clearly feel that our collective security is under siege.
Sure, statistical analysis tells us that, on average, Americans today live longer and with more relative safety and security than at any prior time in human history. But such facts are cold comfort when our television screens are filled with death and destruction and every month, if not every week, we see the fruits of more senseless violence targeting innocent civilians.
It is little wonder that we feel under siege, physically threatened both at the personal and community level. And yet what can realistically be done to fully protect us?
As it turns out, not much. The threat posed by an adaptable, determined enemy seeking lesser-defended targets cannot be stopped just by hardening a subset of potential targets, because there is always a softer target just around the corner. That truth sounds harsh. But it is still the truth.
For example, too many security experts are already talking about further “hardening” all potential targets in order to reduce the risk of an attack being successful. But every time we make a federal building or military base harder to attack, the enemy just seeks out airports or mass transit systems. And if we better secure those spots then they will seek out malls and movie theaters, or schools and concert halls. The list of potential targets is nearly endless. And that is why increased point defense by hardening each potential target only works on a very limited scale.
More guards and a bigger fence may keep you safe by diverting the attack to your lesser-defended neighbor, but they still hit your neighbor. In fact, that is most likely why the terrorists in Brussels recently chose an airport over NATO Headquarters or the U.S. Embassy — they went for the softer target. The truth is that we can’t harden everything. The costs in economic terms as well as loss of liberties and inherent inefficiencies of large-scale, intrusive and perpetual security measures would simply not be accepted by the public at large.
The good news, however, is that the risks can be managed in three critical ways: Better pre-event law enforcement; Reducing the impacts of adverse events through more effective response; and ensuring the resilience of select critical infrastructure systems.
First, and best, is ensuring a full-court press in terms of pre-event law enforcement and intelligence activities. For example, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. developed more than fifty state and local Fusion Centers built around the concept of Intelligence-Led Policing, a proactive policing model designed to improve situational awareness by coordinating the ongoing activities of federal, state and local law enforcement and fostering collaboration by investing in better shared communications networks. This may help detect pre-attack surveillance or in cultivating the networks that pass along a tip when they see suspicious activities by a neighbor.
A second critical step is to reduce the impact of an attack by improving our response systems. While the right number of gates, guards and guns cannot be consistently deployed at every potential attack site, it is much more plausible to ensure we have enough rapid, mobile response assets to quickly get to any given attack site. The key here is to focus on a common response picture in order to get police, medical staff and other responders on-site as quickly as possible to secure the scene, apprehend the perpetrators, prevent any further bloodshed and reduce the loss of life through triage and emergency medical care.
Finally, we need to recognize that some attacks will get through and therefore we are duty-bound to prevent them from having truly catastrophic impacts. Whatever the direct effects of an attack, we must prevent broader systemic ripple effects on the region and nation by identifying which power, communications, transportation and water networks need to be made more resilient. In so doing we can focus our limited resources less on the impossible task of trying to make everything hardened and instead ensure resilience in the face of varied threats.
J. Michael Barrett is a former Naval Intelligence Officer, Fulbright Scholar, and Director of Strategy for the White House Homeland Security Council. He is currently the Director of The Center for Homeland Security and Resilience, a Washington, DC-based think tank.Thinking of submitting an op-ed to the Washington Examiner? Be sure to read our guidelines on submissions.
